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SUMMARY:

b y t he lower court.

This is a Capital Case.

Timely

A stay has been granted

Petr presents two additional constitutional

c hallenges to his conviction.
2e

FACTS and CONTENTIONS:

Petr was found guilty of r ape,

a r med r obbery, kidnapping, motor vehicle theft, and escape from

(

-2-

a pena l

ins t i tut ion and received substantial and consecutive

prison s entences on the last four offenses, the combined length
of wh ich was rendered somewhat irrelevant by a sentence of death
imposed upon the rape charge.,

Petr's princjpal claim is that

the death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth AmendmentsF
both in general and in its application to him through the procedures used by the State of Georgiae

In this claim he echoesp

and specifically adopts by reference, the arguments made by the
petr in Eberheart v., Georgia, No. 74-5174, which is being held
for Fowlerc

c

This case would also be a simple hold for Fowler

except that petr presents two other constitutional challenges to
his conviction.,
First is a claim based upon Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.,S., 162
-(1975) and Pate v., Robinson, 383

u.s.

375

(1966), that he was

denied due process because the State did not adequately determine
whether he was competent to stand trial.

He raised his in-

90mpetency contention prior to trial and, pursuant to Ga., statutory
procedures, a psychiatrist was appointed by the court to examine
petr.

After this examination had been conducted, a hearjng was

heldp before a jury, to determine whether petr was

me~ ly

capable of understanding the proceedjngs against him and capable
of properly assisting his attorney in his defense.

At this

hearing petr testified and, according to the State's response,

(
seemed intelligent, displayed--an accurate memory and was - responsive
to questions on both direct - and cross-examination.
was generally inconclusiveo

The psychiatrist

He - opined that latent mental disorders

were indicated but that he could not arrive at a conclusive
diagnosiso

He apparently ducked a direct question as to whether

petr was competent, but did answer questions on cross indicating
petr could understand the nature of the proceedings against himo
The warden and a prison paramedic at the institution from which
petr had escaped also testified, indicating that petr had not
seemed abnormal to them.

(

On this evidence the jury found pet r

compe tent to stand tr ial. -

'-'

Petr's alternative claim is based upon the Confrontation
Clause o_f the Sixth Amendment.

The court reporter failed to

record the voir dire of the jury except for objections raised
by counsel.

After his conviction, the State moved to correct

this error by means of supplementing the record through an
evidentiary hearing.

Petr's counsel objected on the ground that

petr should be returned from the state prison and present at any
proceeding, but his objectjon was overruled.

The State called

the Clerk of the trial court and questioned him at length
regarding the procedures utilized at the voir dire.

(
'--'

The court

made findings of fact regarding what had transpired, and these
were transmitted to the Ga. Supreme Court along with the original
record.

In affirming the judgment entered on petr's conviction,

(

-4that ~ c ourt

rejected his claim that he had an absolute right

to be present at the post-trial proceedings.

The court characterjzed

tbis proceeding as simply an administrative hearing, at which petr
was a dequately represented by counsel.
DISCUSSION:

3o
~0uld

Since the normal disposition of this case

be a Hold, I assume the Court will not want to consider the

@e r its of petr's other constitutional contentions at this point
~~less

it

is clear they can be dealt with summarily or have such

ingependent importance as to demand plenary consideration.
neither claim is frivolous,

While

I don't believe they meet these

standards.
The Drope/Pate due process claim seems decidedly weaker than
that presented in those cases.

Here Ga. not only provides a

procedural safeguard for defendants' right not to be tried while
incompetent, as did Illinois in Pate and Missouri in Drope, it
also afforded petr that procedure.

Petr's claim is that the

evidence actually introduced was i.nsufficient to resolve the
issue.

He is surely correct that limiting the psychiatrist's

ability to make a complete diagnosis would in some cases be
equivalent to affording no procedure at all, but it isn't clear
that this is such a case or that the elements which persuaded the
Court to reexamine the "fact"Yquestion of competence are present

_vsee Drope, 420 u.s., at 175 n.lO.

(
-:in: this case-.,

There is hotning in the moving papers indicating

why the psychiatrist felt himself unable to do whatever else
wa·s - necessary to complete his dia-gnosis, how and/or by whom his
examination was limited, and whether any objection was made.,
There is _!10 .qtention of any request for a continuance until the
psychiatrist felt willing to extend a diagnosis.

Moreover,

other than· the psychiatrist's equivocation there is really no
evidence supporting the claim of incompetence, and certainly
nothing of the bizarre nature of the histories recited in Pate and
Drope~

(

To accept petr's claim would seem to require that upon

demand a state must afford sufficient time, procedures, facilities,
etco so that a court-appointed psychiatrist can form a

11

conclusive"

diagnosis as to a defendant's competence before that defendant may
be tried.,
Petr's confrontation clause argument is somewhat easier to
dismiss.,

There appear to be three fairly good answers to his

contention:

the Clerk of the Court was not strictly a "witness

against him" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment; the
right to be present is predicated on the right to assist defense
counsel in one's defense, but where the proceeding was to explore
the actions taken at voir dire by the prosecuting attorney and

('--/

defense counsel, petr could have been of no assistance in the
J:?.e~ring~

and, the underlying substantive claim upon which this

procedural challenge is based appears to have been

'

"

conce~ed.

The

-6-

sole purpose of the· post-trial .hearing was to build a record
for reviewing whether any jurors were impermissibly excluded
for cause; but the court found that no jurors had been excluded
for cause, and petr has not challenged this determinationo
There is a response.
11/7/75
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I
guess that this is the rape case you should ~rant,
if only because the others are so unsuitable. Petitioner
was convicted of rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, car theft,
and escape from prison. The death sentence was imposed only
on the rape count. There are twg other noncertworthy questions
one involving the determ~~~~~q~ · or petitioner's coThpetency
to stand trial aq~__the other~'wne~er the Sixth knendment right
to confrontation ;Mr violated by the failure to permit petitioner
to come from prison to be present a a post-trial hearing to
reconstruct part of the voir dire (petitioner's counsel was
present).

March 25, 1977
BENCH MEMO
To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell
Dave Martin
No . 75-5444

Coker v. Georgia

The question is whether the death penalty is a constittuunder the Eighth Amendment
tionally permissible punishment/for the crime of rape. The
question may be viewed more narrowly, since the facts of
this case call for decision only with respect to non-aggravated
rape .

There was no brutalizing of the victimf here, beyond

the act of rape itself.
identified
somewhat
Gregg v. Georgia/asxakliskaa three/overlapping inquiries
for answering the eighth Amendment question:

Does the

punishment comport with evolving standards of decency?
Is it compatible with human dignity?

Is it disproportionate

to the offense?
I don't find the second factor useful here.

The third

seems to call for a somewhat less historical, more a priori
inquiry than the first.

Petr

· 1; has a solid argument
'"' .....H...t ta.'-sfn,.c.f-.
against the death penalty based on disproportionA Gregg,
Roberts and the other cases emphasized several
uniqueness of the death penalty.

a

times the

By th~same token, imposing

death on one's victim is a unique kind of crime.

There are

some kinds of brutalizing assaults that offend us, perhaps,
as much as murder, but

~~
.._.~may

be largely because they

demonstrate that the offender was indifferent to the life
of the victim--he might as well have killed the victim.

In

-2any event, there is a clear dividing line between murder and
assault that does not result in death, and there is certainly
some disproportion k.e.KH.e.eR when the state takes the life of
By the standard of the
an offender who himself has taken no life . /fk.e biblical
maxim "an eye for an eye',' H.RHi.lixx.eR.Ii.ex capital punishment
is
in such circumstances/disproportionate.
Moreover, this case does not present the difficult
question of

/II comparing

brutal assaults.

the death penalty to grossly

Rape is always an awful offense, but

petr's action here --this time--was not brutal.
It seems to me, however, that the most important inquiry
for th's case is the fixxxxfixxx.RR first one specified in
Gregg:

evolving community standards.

objective indicators:
determinations.

There are two primary

legislative judgments and jury

Petr has set forth the statistics in.._

his brief, and there seems to be little quarrel over the
statistics; the fight is over their significance.

Rougly

20 states imposed death for rape in the early 20th century.
This declined--but insignificantly, in my view--to 17 by the
time Furman was decided.

After Furman only three states
LG-a.- \ N .t.} ~. \ \

reenacted the death penalty for rape of adultsl\while three
had some such provision for sexual battery of children.
After Woodson only one adult-rape provision survives--Georgia's.
And the Louisiana legislature, cc ting in response to Roberts,
death ,._
did not revive its/penalty for rape, nori have any of the
other legislatures acting since Woodson and Roberts seen fit
to •••~r••~ impese the tleath penalty ~~" ~ ,
Resp replies--and this seems to me the heart of the issue

-3-

here--that these post-Furman statistics cannot be counted for
too much.

This Court in Woodson in fact counted certain

post-Furman statistics for little (the fact that 10 jurisdictions
had opted for mandatory death penalty schemes), and resp
says the Court should do the same here.

Resp argues that

the failure to reimpose the penalty for rape Was not a
~ ~ ;~

f""~i$"""--*1

D-'1"-

considered legislative judgment -'Aexcessive.

: Abut rather

merely the result of some confusion over Furman's reach.

Most

importantly, resp argues that the states that chose mandatory
death penalty schemes may have left rape off only because
of the mandatory nature of the penalty--they might do differently
under a Georgia-type statute •
m~r

.a:_n

• pet:r s

I

opiniOlil; the 'i'tati'i'tii'iil

eaftftee

8888 a~ge~ f18

iUi' A

uery 'i'trolilg 'i''ltJfleYt! foi

IRQ'i' t.. of resp' s ar.gumen t .

Em r

IIR

Petr also invokes the statistics showing jury determinations.
They generally show axfaiixfaixiJxlsw that death is imposed as
a punishment for rape only in a small number of cases.

Perftaps

most significant are the data from Georgia alone. Since Furman
appellate
there have been 42 reparted/cases where the defendant was
convicted of rape.
death penalty.

In only four did the jury impose the

(Petr's supplemental brief updates the statistics:

the rate is now 4 out of 63.)

Resp does not dispute these

data.
objective
In my opinion, these figures amount to a strong/showing
that evolving societal standards reject capital punishment
as an

acceptable penalty for th~rime of rape.

-4-

Particularly important are the actions of the legislatures.
I do not agree with resp that the

dramat~c

attrition after

. . . Furman can be attributed solely to confusion about the
import of that case.

Thirty-five states completely revamped

their death penalty laws after that decision, necessarily
giving careful attention to what the Members of this Court
said in Furman.

I know of nothing that would have

~xa~me

prompted them to think death fer rape would not be permissibleJ
i{! +(.4y QA\C.I~.&.W. ~ SO\M4. so ... +s o~ C!Pfl iiD.l. f14~isk~ wt.v« ~II CJN~t.·~..,..~ .
Ainstead, I think this reaction to Furman points strongly in
petr's favor.

That case was the occasion for ..-.careful

rethinking of capital punishment statutes.
had abandoned

•

~

Although only 3 states

this punishment for rape in the preceding

50 years, 8'ztb·a• zgl g

§

i

· 1 14 other states gave it up

when finally presented with an occasion for thoroughgoing
revision.

After Roberts, a 15th state joined dis list--Louisiana.

There is one other factor to note.

This evolving standard

has not generally distinguished between aggravated rapes and
non-brutal rapes.

The death penalty in the overwhelming

majority of states is not available for any rape.

In part

this may be the product of the difficulty in defining aggravated
0..

rape in1fway that meaningfully differentiates it from
1\

"ordiinary" rape, a difficulty you noted in Furman.

u.s.,

at 460 .

408

If this trend is to be read as rejection of

the death penalty for any rape, then it might make sense
to write the opinion to make that clear, even though the
issue is not .. L Jj technically presented by the facts of this
case.

-5Finally, I xaHlaxRakx£aRxia do not think

~~Hxaxa

your

vote here is foreordained one way 6r the other by your position
in Furman.

There you explicitly rejected the contention that

capital punishment is unconstitutional when the crime is
rape.

408 U.S., at 456-461.

. . then.

But much has happened since

Your decision in Gregg, etc., accepted . . the

result in Furman as authoritative precedent, and your
position in last term's capital cases bespeaks a different
stance from that assumed in Furman--rightly so, iRx in view
of the rule of stare decisis.

D.M.

75-5444

COKER v. GEORGIA
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CHAMBERS· OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 75-5444, Coker v. Georgia
No. 76-5206, Roberts v. Louisiana
I was asked to assign the opinions in
these two cases. Byron has agreed to undertake an op·inion in Coker, and John Stevens has
agreed to undertake the Per Curiam opinion in
Roberts.

I

~j!) _ /177

Arguing About Death for Rape ·
As the nine black-robed Justices
walked purposefully to their places at
the U.S. Supreme Court bench last week ,
the ornate courtroom seemed even more
somber than usual. Nine months before,
the court had allowed the imposition of
the death penalty for murder. Now it
was being asked to permit capital punishment for crimes in which no life has
been taken . The state of Georgia was
seeking permission to electrocute Ehrlich Anthony Coker for the rape of a I 6year-old housewife.
Coker's attorney, Civil Rights Lawyer David E. Kendall , candidly recited
the ugly details of the crime:
Late on a balmy summer night in
1974, the kitchen door of Allen and Elnita Carver's two-room house was suddenly thrown open. In stepped Coker,
24, a convicted rapist and murderer who
had just escaped from a nearby prison.
Brandishing a three-foot board, Coker
forced Mrs. Carver, who was still recovering from the birth of a son three weeks
earlier, to help tie up her husband in
the bathroom. That done, he grabbed a
steak knife and assaulted her. He then
took her with him as he fled in the Carver car. Sheriff's deputies captured him
on a dead-end road a few hours later.
Georgia is the only state with a law
calling for the death penalty for rape of
an adult woman (Florida and Mississippi provide for execution for the rape of
children). A local jury, after noting Coker's previous convictions for rape-murder and rape-kidnaping, ordered him to
the electric chair. But Attorney Kendall
contended before the Supreme Court
Justices that death was so infrequently
inflicted on rapists that its imposition violated the constitutional ban on cruel
and unusual punishment. Of 42 men
convicted of rape in Georgia since 1973,
3.8 received only prison sentences.
Although both Coker and his viciim were white, Kendall marshaled historical and statistical data to show that
execution for rape was based on race.
Before the Civil War, Georgia Jaw was
typical of Southern statutes in specifying
that a white man raping a black woman could draw a fine or imprisonment
"at the discretion of the court," while a
slave or "free person of color" even attempting to rape a white woman could ·
be put to death. Supposedly color-blind
postwar Jaws were selectively enforced:
since 1930, when accurate record keeping was started, 89% of the 455 rapists
executed in the U.S. have been black.
At one point, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. of Virginia frostily asked Kendall: "What would be an appropriate
punishment for a convicted rapist serving life who escapes and commits another rape?" Incarceration, Kendall re80

plied. Powell drove the point home:
"The same punishment he had before."
Ironically, Coker received solid legal
backing in a friend-of-court brief filed by
seven organizations promoting women's
rights, including the National Organization for Women . These groups demanded effective punishment for rapists, but
they charged that the death penalty is
ineffective because the severity of the
punishment supports demands for elaborate and often humiliating testing of the
victim's testimony. Even so, the feminists argued, juries sometimes acquit an
accused rapist because they feel that the
punishment might be too extreme.
Badly Split. When Georgia Assistant Attorney General E. Dean Grindle warned the court that elimination
of capital punishment for non-death
crimes might have unforeseeable consequences, he found Justice Harry A.
Blackmun already alarmed. A vote for
Coker, said Blackmun, would have "an
adverse effect on federal efforts" to impose death for treason, espionage and
terrorism. But Justice Potter Stewart
hinted that some crime victims might
suffer if capital punishment were extended: "The rapist, for example, might
be encouraged to kill since the penalty
would be the same."
Although the main battle on restoring the death penalty was fought in
1976, last week's hour-long arguments

------and questions were an important skirmish over the extension of capital punishment. The court is badly split, and
while some expansion of the death penalty is probable, there is no way of knowing Coker's fate until the Justices announce it, probably this June.

The Last Word
When William 0 . Douglas reluctantly retired from the U.S. Supreme
Court I 7 months ago at the age of 77.
he was partly paralyzed from a stroke.
in almost constant pain and seemingly
unable to continue the mental exertion
required on the high bench. Friends
feared that the Justice, deprived of official duties, might soon die. Instead ,
Douglas is still working away in his court
chambers, and the old conservationist
has promised friends that he will make
his first public reappearance next month
at the official dedication of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal National Historical Park as a memorial to him. He has
also passed along word that he will send
the final manuscript of his 43rd work,
the second half of his autobiography, to
his publisher this spring. The volume
will cover his spirited court years, and
once again Douglas will enjoy the last
word on many of his critics.
Douglas' fellow Justices, fearing
damage to the court's work and unseemly publicity about his impaired mental
abilities, had prodded him to retire.
They quietly denied him the authority

FORMER JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS WITH WIFE CATHY & COURT AIDE

THE LAW

to write majority court opinions and
postponed all cases in which he might
cast a tie-breaking vote. Though relations were amiable on the surface, other Justices had long been annoyed by
Douglas' personal habits, which included hogging the court limousine, using
Daughter: Mom, can I go out?
court secretaries for commercial writing
and verbally bullying his colleagues durMother: Sure, go enjoy yourself.
ing closed-door conferences.
Don't worry about me sitting here alone
On the day he retired , Douglas wait- all night.
ed all afternoon in his chambers for his
Mother has just created a classic
colleagues to pay their respects, but only double bind, saying yes and no to her
William Brennan and Byron White daughter at the same time. Most parshowed up. (" We had all shaken his ents use such paradoxical commands ochand when his decision was announced casionally because they are unable to reat lunch," explains one Justice.) The solve their conflicting feelings. That
next week, Chief Justice Warren E. familiar behavior may seem harmless.
Burger called Douglas' three law clerks But according to a branch of psychiatry
in for tea, mentioned budget problems known as family therapy, repeated double binding is ordinarily found in famand pointedly asked them if they had
any job prospects. At the request of the ilies that produce schizophrenics.
Unlike most psychiatrists, who beother Justices, Burger also wrote Douglas suggesting that he move from his cen- lieve that schizophrenia arises from agetrally located chambers to a "more com- netic defect or a chemical imbalance,
modious" office in a distant corner of family therapists tend to believe that
schizophrenia is not a disease but a desthe building.
Douglas shot back a note saying he perate strategy adopted by a family in
would stay where he was. He sarcas- trouble. According to this view, the famtically used the word commodious five ily's complex web of emotional transtimes to describe his satisfaction with actions is like a cybernetic, or automathis traditional quarters. To keep his per- ically controlled system. Sometimes,
quisites, Douglas assumed the offensive, when internal pressures threaten to blow
advancing the novel idea that a retired the family apart, one member-usually
Justice retains the right to issue opin- a son or daughter-either knowingly or
ions in court cases of his choosing. Se- unknowingly agrees to become mentally
rious or not, Douglas made his point: ill. In a number of complex ways, this
he now operates with a secretary, a Li- tactic holds the family together. But the
brary of Congress researcher, a driver- child pays a big price. Says Murray Bowmessenger, and a law clerk, who assists en, a clinical professor of psychiatry at
the Georgetown University Medical
in rewriting his latest book.
On a typical day, the gaunt, hollow- Center: "The main building block of
eyed Douglas is bundled into his court schizophrenia is the process through
office by late morning, dawdles over cor- which parental immaturity is transmitrespondence, takes a nap and then ad- ted to children."
Mother's Role. Most family therdresses his manuscript. He tires rapidly
and is usually taken home by midafter- apists try to get at the roots of schizonoon. Burger has become solicitous of phrenia by treating parents and grandDouglas' welfare, attending small social parents as well as the child. But at a
Manhattan conference of family therevents staged by Douglas and his fourth
wife, Cathy, 33, and sending over gifts apists (titled "Beyond the Double
of vintage wine and tasty apricot and or- Bind"), Bowen insisted that the roots go
angejam put up by Burger himself.
farther back. In fact, he believes that it
Look Bad. Happily for the Burger probably takes close to ten generations
regime, Douglas' book will contain lit- of parental weakness to produce a
tle criticism of recent court appointees. schizophrenic.
In any family , according to Bowen,
The first draft, completed before the
stroke, contained savage scolding about one child usually grows up to be strongBurger's management of the court, but er than the parents, most of the others
later versions concentrate on Douglas' remain about as immature as the mothfoes of earlier eras. Says one associate: er and father, and one child does not
"Felix Frankfurter won't be butchered , function .as well as anyone else in the
but he'll be needled to death."
family. Because most people select
Uthe published work is circumspect, mates with levels of emotional maturity
Douglas has kept one last weapon in re- roughly equal to their own, he says, this
serve: upon his death, his entire collec- "weakest child" will grow up to mate
with a similarly impaired adult and start
tion of meticulous notes and papers from
the court's secret conferences will be the cycle over again at a more disturbed
opened to public inspection at the Li- level. Says Bowen: "If we follow the linbrary of Congress, an unprecedented bo- eage of the weakest child of the weaknanza for court watchers. "There's some est child of the weakest child through
amazing stuff in there," says one for- multiple generations, we eventually
mer clerk. "Douglas is a skilled writer, emerge with a child so weak it collapsand he knows exactly how to make his es into schizophrenia on emotional or
physical separation from the parents."
adversaries look bad."

.

~ BEH~

Genealogy of the Weakest Chi
Down through the 1
Bowen believes, each set of
wittingly damages the we<
But the mother's role is m
the weak child is usually tl
the most intense early attach
mother. Troubled mothers •
control their own immaturi
the double bind in caring fc
Example: "Stay an infant, S<
for you. Grow up, be a succ
early study of schizophre1
cited the example of a mott
I LLUST RAT I ON f'OR T IM £ I

"No matter how worthless yo
Marvin, you'll always be spec

dealing with a psychotic so
tered his bread, cut his meat .
his milk, all the while urgin!
learn to do more for himself.
By the last generation,
child can no longer function ;
beyond cure. Says Bowen: "
awful lot of schizophrenia tha
product of these multiple g
The best we're going to do in
is to relieve the symptoms." ·
tle hope "if the goal is to take
and make him as normal as <
was five or six generations a
think nature will put up with
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Rec irculat ed: _____________
No. 75-5444
Ehrlich Anthony Coker,
Petitioner,
On \Vrit of Certiorari to the Suprcme Court of Georgia.
v.
State of Georgia.
[May -, 1977]

MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2001 ( 1972) provides that "a person
convicted of rape shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than 20 years." 1
_ I C J~Punishment is determined by a jury in a separate sentencing
)
proceeding in which at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances must be found before the death penalty may be
imposed. 2 Petitioner Coker was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. Both conviction and sentence were affinned
by the Georgia Supreme Court. Coker was granted a writ of ~ ~
certiorari,- U. S. - - , limited to the single claim, rejected ~LJ- _
by the Georgia court, that the punishment of dea.th for rape /_
..- -~
violates the Eighth Amendment, which proscribes "cruel and ~~_
unusual punishments" and which must be observed by the
States as well as the Federal Government. Robinson v. Cal· ,,..-u...,...:A..~~""""~k.l~
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

~~

I

While serving various sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping and aggravated assault, petitioner escaped from the Ware
1
The section defines rape as ha.ving "carnal knowledge of a female,
forcibly and against her will. Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there
is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ."
2
See n. 3, infra.
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Correctional Institution near Waycross, Ga., on September 2,
1974. At approximately 11 p. m. that night, petitioner
entered the house of Allen and Elnita Carver through an
unlocked kitchen door. Threatening the couple with a
"board," he tied up Mr. Carver in the bathroom, obtained a
knife from the kitchen and took Mr. Carver's money and the
keys to the family car. Brandishing the knife and saying
"you know what's going to happen to you if you try anything,
don't you," Coker then raped Mrs. Carver. Soon thereafter,
petitioner drove away in the Carver car, taking Mrs. Carver.
with him. Mr. Carver, freeing himself, notified the police;
and not long thereafter petitioner was apprehended. Mrs.
Carver was unharmed.
Petitioner was charged with escape, armed robbery, motor
vehicle theft, kidna.pping, and rape. Counsel was appointed
to represent him. Having been found competent to stand
trial, he was tried. The jury returned a verdict of guilty,
rejecting his general plea of insanity. A sentencing hearing
was then conducted in accordance with the procedures dealt
with at length in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (19•76),
where this Court sustained the death penalty for murder when
imposed pursuant to the sta.t utory procedures.' The jury was
"Ga. Code Ann. § 26- 3102 (197/'i supp.)
"Capital offenses ; jury verdict and sentence.-Where, upon n, trial
by jnr~' , a pen;on is com·irted of an offense whi ch ma.y be puni ~ h a ble by
death , a ~ent e nr c of death shall not he impo~ rd unless the jury in clud rs a
finding of at lms t on e stntutory aggravating circumst:mre and a. recommendntion thnt ~ u r h sentence be imposed . vVherc a statutory aggrava,ting
circum«tance is found and a recommendation of death is rnnde, th e court
:;lwll sentence the dcfendnnt to draih. WhC'rc a sentence of death is not
recommended by the jury, the comt shall ~ rntence the dcfendnnt to irnpri ~ onm ent a>< provided by law. Unless the jury trying the case mnkcs
n finding of nt lcn8t one ~tntutory ::tggravaiing circumstance and rC'commends the drnth sentence in it s Yerdi rt, the court shnll not senten ce the
defendant to denth , provided thnt no ~uch finding of stntutory aggravnting
circumst:mrcs shall b e neecf'.<a ry in offenses of treason or nircraft hijnrking.
'1
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instructed that it could consider as aggravating circumstances
whether the rape had been committed by a person with a prior
record of conviction for a capital felony and whether the rape
The provi ·ions of this section sha ll not affect a sentence when the
tried without. a jnry or "·hen thr jud~c accepts n plea of ~uilty.

ca~e

is

"Ga. Code Ann. §27-2.'30Z (1.975 supp.)
"Recommendation to merry.-In nU capital cases, other than those of
homicide, when the verdict is ~uilt.y, with n recommendation to merry. it
shnll be legnl and shall be f1 recommPndution to the jud~c of im])risonmcnt
for life. Such recommend!"Ltion shall be binding upon the jud~e.

"Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2/i."JJ,..J (197/i supp.)
"Mitigating and aggrm•ating circumstanres; death prnalty.-(a) the
death pennlty mny be impo~ecl for t.hr offenses of aircrn fL hijnrkin~ or
treMon. in nny cnse.
"(h) In nll ense~ of other offen~es for which the dcnth pen:1ltv m:1v be
authorizer!, thP judge ~hnll con~ider. or he ~hn ll include in his instmctions
to the jury for it to ron~idf'r. nnv mitig:1ting rirrnml'tanre!< or nggravnting
cirrnmstnncf'S otlwrwise nuthorizecl hv l:1w :1nrl any of the following stntuto
[2gr:-~.vnting circumstnnrf'~ whirh mn~· he stmported bv thr evidcncr:
'(1) The oJTen~e of mmdrr. r:1pe. nrmrd robber~· or kidnnppin~ wns
r mitted b~r fl rwrson wi1h n rmor rrrord of ronvirtion for fl rapitnl
frlonv. or thP offPnse of mmdrr "·n~ committed bv n prrson who h:-ts a
snb.
tin! hi~tory of srrious nssnnltiw criminnl convictions.
'(2)
he offem:r of mnrclN. 1~e. nrmf'd rohhcr:v. or kidnnpping wns
r
1ttrd while the ofTenclrr w:ts eng:-tgf'cl in the rommis~ion of :mother
rnpitnl felonv. or nggrnntrd b:-tttrr~·. or the offense of mmdrr wns committrd while thr offrndrr wns engnged in thr commi<;sion of hurglnry or
ar~on in 1he firRt drgrf'e.
"n) ThP ofTrnrlrr by hi" :-~rt of mmclrr. armed rohhrr~· . or kidnnpping
knowinglv rrented a grf'ftl ri~k of df':1th to more thnn onr prrson in 11.
puhlir nlnrr b~· menn~ of n "'rnnon or drvirc which would normall~· be
h:1zn.rriom: to t hr lin's of morr thnn on<' prr~on.
" ( 4) Thr offrnrlrr com mitt eel t hr offrn~c of murdrr for himself or
n,nothrr. for 1hr purpose of rrrriving mone~r or any of her thin~ of monrtnrv vnh1e.
"(fi) The mnrdrr of :1 judicinl officer, former judirinl offirrr. di~trirt
nttornrv or !<Oliritor or formrr district :1ttornry or 1<oliritor during or
hrrau~r of thr rxrrri~r of his official dut~··

[Footnote .'] is continued on p.

41
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had been committed in the course of committing another
capital felony, namely. the armed robbery of Allen Carver.
The court also instructed. pursuant to statute, that even if
"(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
murder a~ an n~rnt ~nployee of another per. on.
'(7)
he offense of murdrr,~ nrmecl robbery or kidnnpping was
o~ou~ly or w:mt~1ly j!_r, h~e or ~an in thnt it inYolvecltorture, depravity of mind, or an a~gravntrd battery to the Yictim.
"(8) The offense of mmdcr wns comrnittrd against nn~r prace ofTicrr,
corrections emJlloyre or fireman while rngaged in the performance of his
official dutirs.
"(9) The ofTrme of murder was eommittrd by a prrson i11, or who has
esr:~ped from, thr lnwful cu~tod~r of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
"(10) The mmder was commit ted for the purpose of avoiding, int rrferin~ with, or prcYenting a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinemrnt, of himself or another.
" (c) Thf' ~tat ut ory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be
wa.rra.nted by the evidenc·c . hall be given in charge and in writing to the
jury for itR flf'libf'ration.
"The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designatein writing, si~nf'd b~r the forrman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance
or circum~tancr~ which it found beyond a rensonable doubt. In non-jury
ca~c~ the judge ~hall make such designation. Except in ca:-;rs of treason or
aircrnft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in Code Section 27-2534.1 (b) is so found. the·
death pennlty shall not be imposed.
c~
'ttrd

"Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2537 (197/5 supp.)
"Review of death sentences.-(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the·
selltence shall be reviewed on the record by the Suprrme Court of
Georgia. The clerk of the trial court, within ten days after receiving the
tmnscript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to the Supreme
Court of Georgin, together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a
report prepared by the tria.! judge. The notice shall set forth the title
a.nd docket number of the casr, the name of the defendant and the nnme
and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgmrnt, the
offen~e, and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in thr form

I
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a!!:gravatin circumstances were present. the death penalty
nee not be imposed if the jury found mitigating circumstanceR to predominate, that is, circumstances)'constituting
of a. standard que:<tionnaire prepared and supplird hy the Suprrmc Court
of Georgia.
"(h) The Suprrme Court of Grorgin shall consider the punishment ns
well ns nny errors rnumeratrd by w:1y or appeal.
"(r) With rrgard to thr ~rntrncr, thr court shall determinr:
"(1) Whether the srntenrr of drnth was imposed under the innuence
of pnssion, prrjudice, or any othrr n.rhitrnry factor, nnd
"(2) Whethrr, in cn..-es othrr than treason or nircra.ft hijacking, the
evidrnre supp01is the jur.1·'s or judge's finding of a Rtatutory aggranding
rircum~t~nre ns enumerntrd in Codr srrtion 27-2534.1 (h). n.nd
"(r) Whether the srntenre of death is exre,;~ive or disproportionntr to
the pmalty imposrd in ~imilar cnsrs, ronRidering both the crimr nnd the
drfend:mt.
"(cl) Both the dcfrncbnt nnd the Stn.te shall ha.ve the right to submit
brief::: within the time pro,·idccl by the court, :tnd to present. ornl argument
to the court.
" (c) The court shall inrludr in it~ derision a reference to t ho~e similar
rnRcs which it took into considrration. In nddition to iti; authority regardinp; ron"<'ction of rrrors, the romt, with rrgnrd to review or death srntrnces,
shall be ::mthorized to:
"(1) Affirm the srntenrc of drath; or
"(2) Set the sentence aside :md rrmand the case for resrntrncing by
t hr trial judge based on i hr record :mel argument. of conn sri. The records
or those similar cases rcfrrred to by the Supreme Court. of Gr01·gin in its
drrision, and the extmcts prepared as hereinafter providrd for, shall be
provided to the resentrncing judge for his consideration.
"(f) There shall be an ARii~tant to the Supreme Court, IYho shall be an
nttornry appointed by the Chief .Justice of Georgia and who >:hall
Rerve at the pleasure of the court. The court shnll accumulate the rrcords
of all capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after Jnmwry 1,
1970, or such earlier date as the court mny deem approprinte. The Assistnnt shall provide thr court with whatever e:\.'tractrd information it
desires with respect thereto, including bnt not limited to a synopsis or
brief of the facts in the record concerning tho crime and the defendant.
"(g) The court shall be authorized to employ an approprinte staff and
such methoc!H to compile such dnta as arc deemed by the Chief Justice to
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.i ustification or excuse for the offense in question, "but which,
in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or
reducing the degree" of moral culpability or punishment.
R. 300. The jury's verdict on the rape count was death by
electrocution. Both aggravating circumstances on which the
court instructed were found to be present by the jury.

'"-----"-

II

Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and the Court's
decisions last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v.
Flo1-ida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976);
and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976), make unnecessary the recanvassing of certain critical aspects of the
controversy about the constitutionality of capital punishment. It is now settled that the death penalty is not invaria
cruel .nd unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendmen ; 1t is not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of pun ishment for crime; n-;ither is it
ah~v.§. d ~~pro12.2rtionate to the crime for which it is imposed.
It is also established that imposing capital punishment, at
least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided
under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmities vvhich led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia., supm.
In sustaining the imposition of the death penalty in Gregg,
however, the Court firmly embraced the holdings and dicta
be nmn·opriate nnd rcle\'ant to the statutory que::;tions concerning the
validi ty of the sentence.
"(h) The office of the A::;::;i~tant shall be attached to the office of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia for administrative purposCf'.
"(i) The sentence review shall he in nddition to dirert :tppeal, if taken,
and the re\·iew and nppeal shall be ronsolidatrd for consideration. The
court shall render its derision on legal rrrors enumerated, the factual
Hubstantiation of the verdict , and the validity of the sentence."

lA

V\
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from prior cases, Furman v. Georgia, supra; Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 661 (1962); Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86
(1958); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (19'10), to
the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that arc "ba.rbaric" but also those that are
"exc~i~e" in relation to the crime. commi~d . u naer Gregg,
a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it
(1) makes no measurable ontribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and wncc is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly
~ J:~.2Pffitl9 n to the severity of the crime. A punishment
might fail t e test on either ground. Furthermore, these
Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or a.ppear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment
should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent. To this end, attention must be given to the
p~ic a,tli.~es conceu 1ing a particular senwnce-history a.nd
precedent, legislative attitudes and the response of juries
reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted. In
Gregg, after giving due regard to such sources, the Court's
judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder
was neither the purposrlcss imposition of severe punishment
nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But
there was reserved the question of the constitutiona.lity of the
death penalty when imposed for other crimes. 428 U. S., at
187 n. 35.

IIT
Tha.t question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is
now before us. We have concluded that a sentence of death
is ~·ossly dis12roportionate punishment for the crime of rape,
is excessive and is tiierefore'"Torbidaen by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. 4
4 Because the death sentenre i~ a dit>proportiona.tc puni~lunent for rape,
it is cruel and unusw1l punit>hmcnt within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment eYen though it mny mensumbly serve the legitimate ends

~

1

~
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A
As advised by reccn t cases. we seck O'Uidance in history and
from the objective evidence of the cou~try"S p~sent judgment
concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of
an adult woman. At no time in the last 50 years has a
majority of the States authorized. death as a punishment for
rape. In 1926, 18 States. tlw District of Columbia. and the
Federal Government authorized capital punishment for the
rape of an adult female. 5 That number had declined, but not
substantially. by 1971 just prior to the decision in Furman v.
Georgia-16 States )}us thr Federal Government.° Furman
then invalidated most of the capita pums ment statutes in
this country, including the rape statutes, because. among other
reasons. of the manner in which the death penalty was
imposed and utilized under those laws.
With their death penalty statutes for the most part inva.lidated. the States were faced with the choice of enacting
modified ca.pital punishment laws in an attPmpt to satisfy the
requirements of Furman or of being satisfied with life imprisonment as the ultimate punishment for any offense. Thirtyof punishmrnt and therrfore is not invalid for its failme to do so. We
observe that in the light of thr legislative decisions in almo~t all of the
Sta.tcs and in most of the counlrit>s around the world, itf'?would be difficul'll
to snpport a claim thnt the death pennliy for rape is an indi~pensable p:-~rt
of the States' criminal justice system.
5
Bye, Recent History and Pre~ent Stntus of Capital Punishment in the
United States, 17 .Tomnal of Criminal La,w 234, 241-242 (1926).
0 Aln. Code, Tit. 14, § 395 (1958 rrcornp. val.); Ark. StnJ. Ann. § 414303 (1964); Fin. Stat. Ann. § 794.01 (1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 2G-2001
(1970 rev. val.); Ky. Rev. Stat.. Ann. §§ 435.080-435.090 (1963); Ln. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (1950); Mel. Code Ann. § 27-461 (1957); Miss. Code
Ann. § 2358 (1956 recornp. val.); Vernon's Mo. Stat. Aim. § 559 ..260
(1953); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363 (1967) (mpe with ·ub lan1.ial bodily
harm); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-21 (1953); Okla,. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21,
§ 1115 (1958); S. C. Code Ann. §§ 1G-72, 16-80 (1962); Tenn. Code Anll.
§ 39-3702 (1955); Vernon's Tex. Penni Code Ann. § 1189 (1961); Va..
Code Ann. § 18.144 (1960 rep!. vol.); 18 U. S. C. A. § 2031 (1970).

'

.
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five States immediately reinstituted the death penalty for a.t
least limited kinds of crime. Gregg v. Georgia. S'Upra, at 179
n. 23. This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital
punishment, evidenced by the immediate, post-Furman legislative reaction in a large majority of the State's. heavily
influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder
in Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U. S .. at 179-182.
But if the "most 1narkecl indication of a society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative
J·esponse to Furman," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 179. it should
also be a 1elling datum that the pnblic judgment with respect
to rape, as reflected i11 t he statutes providing the punishrnent
for that crime, ha.s been dramatically different. In reviving
death penalty laws to satisry llurman's ma.ndate. none of the
States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose
to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in
which rape had been a capital offeuse. onl~ three provided the
death pena.lty for rape of an adult woman in their revised
statutes-Georgia., North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the
latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those
found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson
and Roberts. When Louisiana, responding to the latter decisions. again revised its capital punishment laws, rape was not
among the crimes for which it sought to retain the death
penalty. None of the six other States that have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976/
including four States (in addition to Louisia.n a) thn.t had
authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had
reacted to FU1·man with ma.ndatory statutes. included ra.pe

I

7
1976 Okla. Sess. Laws, r. 1, p. 627 (Fir~t Extraord. Se~,;.) (July 23 ,
1976); La. Acts 1976, No. 316 (Aug. 1, 1976), La. Acts 1976, No. 694 (Aug.
2, 1976); 1976 Ky. Acts, r. 15 (Extraord. SoPs.) (Dec. 22 , 1976); 1977
Wyo. Sess. Laws, c. 122 (Feb. 28, 1977). Very rec@t legislative action
has al~ o taken phce in Virginia, Maryland, and New Jen;;ey. In Virginia, the Governor has signed tlw legislation into law; but in l\1aryland
and New Jersey, gubernatorial action has not, yet been completed.

I
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among the cnmes for which death was an authorized
punishment.
Georgia argues tha.t 11 of the 16 States that authorized
death for rape in 1972 attempted to comply with Furman by
enacting arguably mandatory dea.th penalty legislation and
that it is very likely that aside from Louisiana and North
Carolina, these States simply chose to eliminate rape as a
capital offense rather than to require death for each and every
instance of ra.pe. 8 The argument is not without force; but
five of the 16 States did not talm the mandatory course and
also did not continue rape as a capital offense. Further, as
we have indicated, Louisiana and the legislatures of four other
of the 11 arguably mandatory States have revised their death
penalty laws since Woodson and Roberts; rape is not among
the capital offenses contained in these new laws. And this is
to sa.y nothing of the 19 other States that enacted nonmandatory, post-Furman statutes and chose not to sentence rapists
to death.
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee
also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only
where the victim was a child and th;; rapist an '";,dult. 9 The
Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death
U. S. sentence was ma.ndatory. Collins v. State, (1977). The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in
the United States at the present time that authorizes a
The 11 States which rcRpondcnt plarc~ in this ratlf'gory arc as follows:
"Ky. Tie,·. Stat.§ 507.020 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (1974);
l\'Id. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 413 (Supp. 1976); Mi,~. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-19,.
97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Vernon's Mo. Stnt. Ann.
§§ 559.005, 559.009 (Supp. 1976); Nev. Re,·. Stat. § 200.030 (1975 Rev.);
N. C. Gen. Stat.§§ 14-17, 14-21 (Cum. Snpp. 1975); 21 Okla. S1at. Ann.
§§ 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975); S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-52 (Supp. 1975); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406, :39-3702 (1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.210, 18.2-31 (1975 Rev.)."
g Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.011 (2)
(1976-1976 Supp.); Mis;;. Code Ann ..
§ 97-3-65 (1974); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3702 (1974).
8

)
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sentence of dea.t h when the ra.pe victim is an adult woman,
and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment
when the victim is a child.
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for
rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it
obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman. 10

B

It was also observed in Gregg that "t~ . . . is a significant and reliable index of contemporary values because it
is so directly involved," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 181, and
that it is thus important to look to the sentencing decisions
that juries have made in the course of assessing whether
capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime
being tried. Of course, the jury's judgment is mearful on ly
where the jury has an appropriate measure of choice as to
whether the death penalty is to be imposed. As far as execution for rape is concerned, this is now true only in Georgia
and in Florida; and in the latter State, capital punishment is
authorized only for the rape of children.
According to the factual submissions in this Court, out of
all rape convictions in Georgia since 1973-and tha.t total
number has not been tendered-63 cases had been reviewed
by the Georgia. Supreme Court as of the time of oral a.rgument; and of these. six involved a death sentence, one of
which was set aside, leaving five convicted rru2ists now under
s~!~.~-£!~!!:!:.b...i~! State or'G eorgia. Georgia juries have
..__.

"'

In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102 ( 1958), the Comt took p~ins to
note the clim~te of international opinion concrrning tho arcept~bility of
a particular punishment. It is thus not irrclev~nt here tha.t out of 60
major nations in the world snn·eyed in 1965, only three rrtninrd the
de~.t.h penalty for rupe whrrr drn.th did not ensue. United Nntions,
Departmrnt of Economic nne! SoC'ial AfTairs, Capital Pnni~hment (1968)
40, 86.
10
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thus sentenced rapists to death six times since 1973. This
obviously is gQt a negligible number; and the State argues
that as a practical mattcr juries simply reserve the extreme
sanction for extreme cases of rape and that recent experience
surely does not prove that jurors consider tho death penalty
to be a disproportionate punishment for every conceivable
instance of rape. no matter how aggravated. Nevertheless, it
is true that in the vast majority of cases, at least nine out of
10, juries have not imposed the death sentence.

IV
These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of
the .. acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. Nevertheless, the legislative rejection of ca.p.ital
punishment for rape strongly confirms our. own judgment, ~
which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for
1 ~cnmc ofrap'l'ng an adult woi;;an. ..
"
'"
e do not discount the seriousness of ra.pe as a crime. It
«shighl"ll:..feprehensible, both in a moral sense a.nd in its almost
to, a17o";1tempTior the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short
olhomicick;, it is the "ultimate yiola_tion of self." 11 It is also
a violent crime because it normally involves force, or tho
threat of force or intimidation. to overcome the will and the
capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physi~a!, injur! to th,; fem,&e and can !2~t

I

.//;!'

-

11 Law Enforcement Assi~tance
Victims: A Report for Citizens,
Agencies 1 (1975), quoting Bard
vestigation of Forcible Rape, The
Appendix 1b to the Report.

Administration Report, Rape and Its
Health Facilities and Criminal Ju~ticc
& Elli ·on, Crisis, Intervention and InPolice Chief, May 1974, Heproduccd as

'

0
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1

melJ..lial d~e. ~ Because it undermines th ~ commun'ty's
s=
of secunty, there is public injury as well. ~ tC_.
Rape is without doubt deserving.of serious punishment, but
in terms of moral rlea avity and of the injury to the person
and to the public, it aoes not compare with murde~ which
docs involve the unjustified takii1g oT human life. Although
it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition
docs not in
e he death or even the serious injury to
another 12-erson. ~ The murc erer dl s; t 1e rapist, if no more
than th;t, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderers; for the rape victim, life may not be ncady so happy as
it was, but it is not over and ~1·ormall] is not beyond repair.
We have the abiding conviction that the dcaili penalty, wh1ch
"is unique in its severity and revocability," 428 U. S. 187, is
an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life.
This doe~..§nd the _1nattcr; for under G~orgia law. death
may not be imposed for a'hy capital offense, incTUding rape,
unless the ·ur, or judge finds one of the statutory aggravating
(
circumstances and then e ec R o nnpose a sen ence.
ectiOl~ (supp.) 1975; Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 165~
166. For the rapist to be executed in Georgia. it must
therefore be found not only that he committed rape but also
that one or more of the following aggravating circumstances
were present: (1) tha.t the rape was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; (2) that
the rape was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery;
or (3) the rape "was g_utrageous or wantonly vjle, horrible or
inhuman in that itm voTveCI torture, depravity of mind or
...............

I

,

<7

1

-

- -> I

1

~ See Note, The Victim In a Forcible Rape Case : a Feminist Yir\\' , 11
American Criminal Law Review 335, 338 (1972); Comment, Rnpc and
Rape Laws : Sexism in Society and the Law, 61 Cnlif. L. Re\'. 9HJ , 922-923
(197:3) .
1 3 Sec n. 1, supra, for tlw Georgin definition of ra pe.

}

7
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aggravated battery to the victim." 14 Here, the :first two of
these aggravating circumstances were alleged and found by the
JUry.
Neither of these circumstances, nor both of them together,
change our conclusion that the death sentence imposed on
Coker is a disproportionate punishment for rape. Coker had
prior convictions for capital felonies-rape, murder and kidnapping-but obviously none of them had been deemed by
the sentencing jury to warrant the death penalty; a.n d these
prior convictions do not change the fact that the instant crime
being punished is a rape not involving the taking of life.
It is also true that the present rape occurred while Coker
was committing armed robbery, a felony for which the Georgia
statutes authorize the death penalty.' 5 But Coker was tried
for the robbery offense as well as for rape and received a
separate life sentence for this crime; the jury did not deem
the robbery itself deserving of the death penalty, even though
accompanied by the aggravating circumstance, which was·
stipulated, that Coker had been convicted of a prior capital
crime.'~
14 Thrre :He othrr aggrnvnting rircumstnnces provided in thr statute , src
n. 3. su7'ra., but. they nrr not npplirnble to rape.
'"In Grega v. Gem·gia, thr Georgin Suprrmr Court rcfnsrd to Rust nin
a drnth srntencr for :umrd robhrrv berausr, for onr renRon, drnth hnd
bern so srldom imposrd for this crime in othrr rasrs that f'urh a sentrnre
was exre:sive :-~nd could not hr sustninrd under the st:-~tutr. As it did in
thi~ ra,e, however, the Georgia Supreme Court app:-~rently continues to
recognize armed rohbrry ns a capital ofTrn. r for the purpo"r of appb•ing
thr aggravating cirrnmstnncrs provif'iom; of the Grorgia Code.
tn Vlhrre the aecompnnying capitnl crime is mnrdcr. it is most likrly thnt.
the defcnd:-~nt. would be trird for murder, rather than rape; and it j,;
prrhnps :w:-~drmic to drnl with thr drath sentrnce for rapr in snch a
circumstnnrr. It. is likrwisr unnrcrss:1r~· to con,:idrr the rapr-frlony
murdcr-n rnpe accompanird h~· thr drath of thr victim whirh wn~ lmlnwfnlly but nonmaliriousl~r rnusrd by the drfrnclant.
Whrre the third aggrnv:-~ting rircumstancr mentionrd in the trxt i~
present-that the rape is pnrticulnrly vilr or involves torture or aggmvutcd

~

----- --

._.....

~
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We note finally that in Georgia a person commits murder
when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either
express or implied, causes the death of another human being.
He also commits that crime when in the commission of a
felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice. But even where the killing is deliberate,
it is not punishable by death absent proof of aggravating
circumstances. It is difficult to accept the notion, and we do
~' with or without aggravating circumstances,
should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer as
long as tho rapist docs not himself take the life of his victim.
The judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court is reversed and
tho case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

baiLery-it would seem that the defendant could very likely be com·icted,
tried and appropriately punished for this additional conduct.

--- - --
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Coker v. State of Georgia
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring and dissenting.
Although I concur in the judgment of the Court

on the facts of this case, and in much of its reasoning, I
dissent from the holding that regardless of the circumstances capital punishment always is disproportionate
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the

cri~e

of raping an adult woman.J7At the outset, I note that

the Court's opinion

w-d.L
beyond what is necessary to

ranges ~

decide this case. The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating
circumstances that may be considered by the jury when
appropriate.

With respect to the crime of rape, only

three such circumstances are specified:

(i) the

~
offense ~

1\

committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony:

(ii) the offense was committed while

the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in
aggravated battery: and (iii) the offense was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture,
victim".

!>; ,

depr ~ v1ty

of mind, or an aggravated battery to the

Ante, at 3.

2.

Only the latter describes in general the
q-~
offense of aggravated rape, identifed rmaer tbe lau of ...

A

~y~aees

as a separate and more heinous offense than
~

rape.

1

Petitioner Coker, apparently • vi-cious afl'd incor1\

rigible {criminal, ante at 1, escaped from prison on
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and
gagged husband.

As vicious as this crime was, it was

not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime

~~~istinguished

from ordinary rape.

The jury

was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's
aggravating circumstances presumably because the evidence
did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or
t/1-

~

,

•

,

~ ~_,.,~ • .,.~14

wanto~ly ~i~e, hor~ible or inhuma:_""

J Tnus,

if the._ term

"~ary" may be used in connection with an offense so
"-.,

repugnan~

/

/

concepts of decency, the law generally
"

·I'

recognizes a distinction between rape that is ordinary i
the sense that the act itsel

js free from extreme sexua

/ victim is
he

depravity
/

'

unli~ly

permanent physical or mental injury.

to suffer

I use

n

~.

,,; ;)ZIJ

3.

)

Thus, the case presented for our
decision is not one of aggravated rape as defined
by the relevant provision of the Georgia
statute.

It therefore was unnecessary for the

Court to write in terms so sweeping as apparently
to foreclose each of the fifty state legislatures
from creating a substantive crime o
rape punishable by death.~[
n The

aggravated

~>
in

Court~

accord with our decisions last Term, that:
II

. . the death penalty is not

invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment; it is
not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of punishment
for crime; neither is it always
disproportionate to the crime
for which it is imposed."

Ante at 5.

4.
The Court then concludes that a "se'n tence of death is

grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is exces-

sive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment".

Ante at 7.

If this conclusion were limited to the case

before us or to the crime of rape free from the type of

aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would be in

entire accord with the judgment of disproportionality.

Rapes, however, are not fungible.

As noted in

Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there

is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of

rapists".

A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated

f/2.--/

circumstances either in the manner in which the crime '"'"W'Cls
1\

committed or in the effect upon the victim.

The range,

both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well

be broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any

other common law crime.

Thus, in what might be called the

usual rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly

excessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment.

,

5.

But all rapes cannot be characterized as "usual".

Some are the most __ atrocious intrusions upon

th~

personal

privacy and dignity of the victim known to the law.

some result in the most serious consequences.

And

The Court

itself acknowledges that rape is one of the ugliest of

crimes:
"It is highly

rep~ehensible,

both in a moral sense and in
its total contempt for the

I

personal integrity and~1:'-~
~c-<;t~

autonomy of the female victim
and for the latter's privilege

~

of choosing' those with whom
intimate relationships ought to
be established.

Short of homi-

cide, it is the 'ultimate
violation of self'".

Ante at 12.

In addition, rape is never a crime

I

{,. ,(.

~;

committed\ rarely can it be said to be

unpremeditated~ften
physical

the victim suffers serious

and the psychological

injury~

consequences may be more serious even than per.i~

manent bodily harm.

/~



Yet, despite all that can

y

and indeed acknowledged by the Court ~ as
to

1--k

~

~
sordid, heinous nature of a particular

and the physical and psychological injuries
~right

result, the Court draws a

line be-

'
and murder.

It / s said,

one may say, t at life is "over
murd

rers~

victim, life may n

so happy as it

." .

was, but it is

for the rape

"is not over" for

To be sure, life
rape victim, but

I

- a history of ,/ his

documents -

I
I

life loses i s meaning
I

injured physically

r psychologically

rape victims, often the
consequences were worse than death.

Nevertheless,

LFP/lab
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Yet, despite the almost infinite
in the

~wti(ch~
this offense

can be committed and

A

•

~

in its effect upon the victim, the CourtAtreats all
rapes alike.
between

~

The Court then draws a bright line ·

J- f t.A.--~--
rapes and murder)

~ife

is "over for the

victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair." ~

In

its next sentence, the Court expresses an "abiding
conviction that the death penalty •
penalty for the rapist. .

II

is an excessive

Ante at 13.

This con-

~

viction apparently includes the victim whose life is
"beyond repair", a view that I cannot ~.
uze;;a
The history of this crime abundantly documents
that life may indeed lose its meaning for the victim so
grievously injured physically
again to live normally.

or~ychologically

as never

There have been surviving rape

victims for whom the consequences are worse than death.
It cannot be said as to every rape case that the victim's
"life • • • is not beyond repair."

7.

in making its judgment of disproportionality, the
Court views all rapes as being identical.

So

long as one survives a rape, capital punishment
for the crime would

e excessive wholly without

regard to the circumstances or the shattered

'1'~~

\

~
IV

I

I
\

ondition of the

?F .

{ ) - - of the

may be greater

murderer.

The

l~

~tV//

than~ the

~~

crime often is committed

"

(as in felony murder for example) with far less

~~~~
delilser«ti:c::R=aa=edd;;).:Rtta~ j a-ing ,.i_,,......,t th.a,n ~~~ t!:JHte

~~~ ~~
~---------.......
~
Amany

rapes.-

the difference between

attempted murder is a fortuitous
accident without

entirely on whether the
survives.

See Ralph v. Warden, Maryland

Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786, 794 (Haynesworth, con
curring) · -------------------------------------

8.

In su mary, where the cr1me - as
recognizes is "short of homicide • • • the
'ult'mate violation of self'", ante at 12, we

<17

2--~~

~~

~should not deny to the legislative branch of

.

government the right to identify the elements of
I
/:11•
•

~~

"1 ~~

.&p' ¢;£::t:Z(:;

aggravation that may justify capital punishment~~ ,

~

A · ·-

~

~ need

A

I

~~

'

~,//~~

not undertake a

I\

the relevant criteria.

eetail€~

formulation of

Georgia describes them as

when the offense is committed "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."

The Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. warden,
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty
was an appropriate punishment for rape only where
the life of the victim was "in danger".

Chief

Judge Haynesworth, who joined in the panel's
opinion, thought that this test was appropFiate
~

in that case.

~~/~~tie ks~ I b.+~ ~capital

punishment

~

wears-be excessive and violative of the Eighth
1'\

Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered

9.

"grievous physical or psychological harm".

Id.,

Cfk~
at 794. AI would eschew attempting any
formulation of a disproportionality test, as this
properly is a legislative function.

I do think

the test should embrace consideration of the
factors discussed above:

the culpability of the

offender, the circumstances and manner in which
the offense was committed, and the consequences
suffered by the victim.

Where a state statute

prescribes appropriately the elements of the
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the

in Gregg, I would find no basis for holding that

~

c ~~ec:1'

death is a disproportionate penalty fo~
(\.

~~

/1

1

11

-

~/U~~~~ •.
~most ao:rgig =ef Ml erimSla&.. The death penalty ~
1\.

would be reserved only for the rare case of a
~

rape so outrageous

and ~serious

in its consequences

as to justify society's ultimate penalty.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring and dissenting.
Although I concur in the judgment of the Court
on the facts of this case, and in much of its reasoning, I
dissent from the holding that regardless of the circumstances capital punishment always is disproportionate
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the
crime of raping an adult woman.
At the outset, I note that the Court's
opinion ranges well beyond that is necessary to decide
this case.

The Georgia statute, sustained in QFegg v.

georgia, 428

u.s.

153 (1976), specifies aggravating

circumstances that may be considered by the jury when
appropriate.

With respect to the crime of rape, only

three such circumstances are specified:

(i) the offense

was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony; (ii) the offense was committed while
the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in
aggravated

battery~

and (iii) the offense was "outrageously

or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim".

Ante, at 3.

2.

Only the latter describes in general the
offense of aggravated

~ape,

often identifed as a

separate and more heinous offense than rape.
Petitioner Coker, apparently an incorrigible
criminal, ante at 1, escaped from prison on
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and
gagged husband.

As vicious as this crime was, it was

not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime
may be distjnguished from ordinary rape.

The jury

was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's
aggravating circumstances presumably because the evidence
did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman", or that there was an
aggravated battery.
Thus, the case presented for our decision is
not one of aggravated rape as defined by the relevant
provision of the Georgia statute.

It therefore was

unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so sweeping as
apparently to foreclose each of the fifty state
legislatures from creating a substantive crime of

3.

aggravated rape punishable by death.
The Court holds, in accord with our decisions
last Term, that:
" • • • the death penalty is not
invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime;
neither is it always disporportionate
to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante at 5.
The Court then concludes that a "sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is excessive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment".

Ante at 7.

If this conclusion were limited to

the case before us or to the crime of rape free from the
type of aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would
be in entire accord with the judgment of
disproportionality.
Rapes, however, are not fungible.

As noted in

4.

Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there is
extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists".
A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated circumstances either in the manner in which the crime is
committed or in the effect upon the victim.

The range,

both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well be
broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any other
common law crime.

Thus, in what might be called the usual

rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly
execessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment.
But all rapes cannot be characterized as
"usual".

Some are the most atrocious intrusions upon the

personal privacy and dignity of the victim known to the
law.

And some result in the most serious consequences.

The Court itself acknowledge that rape is one of the
ugliest of crimes:
"It is highly reprehensible, both
in a moral sense and in its total
contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter's privilege of choosing

5.

start those with whom

i~timate

relationships ought to be established.

Short of homicide, it is

the 'ultimate violation of self'".
Ante at 12.
In addition, rape is never a crime committed accidentally;
rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated; often the
victim suffers serious physical injury; and the psychological
consequences may be more serious even than permanent
bodily harm.
Yet, despite the almost infinite variation
in the degree of brutality in which this offense can
be committed and in its effect upon the victim, the
Court simply treats all rapes alike.

The Court then

draws a bright line between rapes and murder.

It is

said life is "over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair."

In its next sentence, the Court expresses an

"abiding conviction that the death penalty • • • is an
excessive penalty for the rapist ••

." .

Ante at 13.

This conviction apparently includes the victim whose

6.

life is "beyond repair " , a view that. I cannot
accept.
The history of this crime abundantly
documents that life may indeed lose its meaning for the
victim so grievously injured physically or psychologically
as never again to live normally.

There have been

surviving rape victims for whom the consequences are
worse than death.

It cannot be said as to every rape

case that the victim's "life • . • is not beyond repair."
The Court ignores the degree of culpability
of the assailant as well as the effect upon the victim.
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater
than that of the murderer.

The crime of murder often

is committed (as in felony murder for example) with
far less premeditation and less deliberately demeaning
of the victim than in many rapes.
In my view, this Court should not deny
to the legislative branch of government the right to
identify the elements of aggravation that may justify
capital punishment for rape.

One need not undertake

in this case formulation of the relevant criteria.
Georgia describes them as when the offense is committed
"outrageously or wantoriy vile, horrible or inhuman in

7.

\

that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an

I

I

I

aggravated battery to the victim."

The Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. Warden,
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty was
an appropriate punishment for rape only where the life
of the victim was "in danger".

Chief Judge Haynesworth,

who joined in the panel's opinion, thought that this
test was appropriate in that case.

In general, he

views capital punishment as excessive and violative of
the Eighth Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered
"greivous physical or psychological harm".

Id., at 794.

But I would eschew attempting any formulation of a disproportionality test, as this properly
is a legislative function.

I do think the test should

embrace consideration of the factors discussed above:
the culpability of the offender, the circumstances and
manner in which the offense was committed, and the
consequences suffered by the victim.

\ihere a state

statute prescribes appropriately the elements of the
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the other
safeguards that we identified in Gregg, I would find
no basis for holding that death always is a disproportionate penalty for this crime--most sordid of all
crimes.

The death penalty thus would be reserved only

B.
for the rare case of a rape so

outra~eous

and so

serious in its consequences as to justify society's
\

ultimate penalty.
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The Court's opinion permits, as a penalty for the

crime of rape , the imposition of life imprisonment without

parole.

If one serving such a sentence escapes and commits

a second rape (as Coker did in this case) no additional

punishment of any consequence could be imposed.

Despite

the absence of conclusive evidence, we recognized in Greg

and related cases that deterrence may be a l egitimate motive

for the imposition of capital punishment.

Today's decision

deprives society of the power to create any effective deter-

renee of rape by escaped life termers.

Rider C

Furmand v. Georgia 408 u.s. 238, 456-461 (1972) (Powe,l l,

J., dissenting).

LFP/tap
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Rider A

Coker

The Court suggests that if a rape is sufficiently

brutal the offender may be trie d for battery as well as

rape.

adopt.

This may be an option that a state legislature would

But I perceive no reason for this Court to fore-

close a different legislative choice.

Traditionally,

aggravated rape has been a different and more heinous
. than
cr1me;rape.

See model penal code, tentative draft number

four, c §207.4, p. 246 (1955).

The fractionalizing of a

crime of aggravated rape, as a justification for more

lenient treatment of the offender, certainly is not

justified by the constitution.

LFP/lab
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Coker
dissenting.
Although I concur in

the facts of this case, and
~ dissent

~A mwg~

of its

I

from the holding that regardless of the circum-

stances capital punishment always is disproportionate
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the
crime of raping an adult woman.
At the outset, I note that the Court's
1

opinion ranges well beyond 1 hat is necessary to decide
this case.

The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating
circumstances that may be considered by the jury when
appropriate.

With respect to the crime of rape, only

three such circumstances are specified:

(i) the offense

was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony; (ii) the offense was committed while
the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in
aggravated battery; and (iii) the offense was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim".

Ante, at 3.

2.

\ct
Only the

I

J

••

,7'\.1.~"'-'!_

b&~F~describes

in general the

offense of aggravated rape, often identifed as a
separate and more heinous offense than rape.
Petitioner Coker/, apparently an incorrigible'\
( criminal, ante at 1, \escaped from prison on
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and
gagged husband.

As vicious as this crime was, it was

not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime
may be distinguished from ordinary rape.

The jury

was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's
aggravating

circumstance~~resumably

because the evidence

did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman", or that there was an
aggravated battery.
Thus, the case presented for our decision is
not one of aggravated rape as defined by the relevant
provision of the Georgia statute.

It therefore

~ tS

unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so sweeping as
apparently to foreclose each of the fifty state
legislatures from creating a substantive crime of

3.

aggravated rape punishable by death.
The Court holds, in accord with our decisions
last Term, that:
"

. . the death penalty is not

invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime;
neither is it always disporportionate
to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante at 5.
The Court then concludes that a "sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is excessive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment".

Ante at 7.

If this conclusion were limited to

the case before us>or to the crime of rape free from the
type of aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would
be in entire accord with the judgment of
disproportionality.
Rapes, however, are not fungible.

As noted in

4.
Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there is
extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists".
A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated circumstances either in the manner in which the crime is
committed or in the effect upon the victim.

The range,

both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well be
broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any other
common law crime.

Thus, in what might be called the usual

rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly
execessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment.
But all rapes cannot be characterized as

"usua~ •

Some are the most atrocious intrusions upon the

personal privacy and dignity of the victim known to the
law.

And some result in the most serious consequences.

The Court itself acknowledgelthat rape is one of the
ugliest of crimes:
"It is highly reprehensible, both
in a moral sense and in its total
contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter's privilege of choosing

5.
~

those with whom intimate

relationships ought to be established.

Short of homicide, it is

the 'ultimate violation of self'".
Ante at 12.
In addition, rape is never a

crim~

committed accidentally;

rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated; often the
victim suffers serious physical injury; and the psychological
consequences may be more serious even than permanent
bodily harm.
Yet, despite the almost infinite variation
vJ•

in the degree of brutality

~~

which this offense can

be committed and in its effect upon the victim, the
Court simply treats all rapes alike.

The Court then

draws a bright line between rapes and murder.

It is

said life is "over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair."

In its next sentence, the Court expresses an

"abiding conviction that the death penalty .
excessive penalty for the rapist • .

"

. is an

Ante at 13.

This conviction apparently includes the victim whose

6•

life is "beyond repair'', a view that I cannot
accept.
The history of this crime abundantly
documents that life may indeed lose its meaning for the
victim so grievously injured physically or psychologically
as never again to live normally.

There have been

surviving rape victims for whom the consequences are
worse than death.

It cannot be said as to every rape

case that the victim's "life . • . is not beyond repair."
The Court ignores the degree of culpability
of the assailant as well as the effect upon the victim.
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater
than that of the murderer .

The crime of murder often

is committed (as in felony murder for example) with
far less premeditation and less deliberately demeaning
of the victim than in many rapes.
In my view, this Court should not deny
to the legislative branch of government the right to
identify the elements of aggravation that may justify
capital punishment for rape.

One need not undertake

in this case formulation of the relevant criteria.
Georgia describes them as when the offense is committed

J

"outrageously or wanton¥ vile, horrible or inhuman in

7.

that it involved torture, depravity qf mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim."

The Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. Warden,
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty was
an appropriate punishment for rape only where the life
of the victim was "in danger".

Chief Judge Hayntsworth,
v

who joined in the panel's opinion, thought that this
test was appropriate in that case.

In general, he

views capital punishment as excessive and violative of
the Eighth Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered
"grej /TOus physical ,or psychological harm".

Id., at 794.

But I would eschew attempting any formulation of a disproportionality test, as this properly
is a legislative function.

I do think the test should

embrace consideration of the factors discussed above:
the culpability of the offender, the circumstances and
manner in which the offense was committed, and the
consequences suffered by the victim.

Where a state

statute prescribes appropriately the elements of the
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the other
safeguards that we identified in Gregg, I would find
no basis for holding that death always is a dispropor-

tllf .. -1'~~
tionate penalty for this &rieme
crimes.

A

/f..V ~

most sordid of all

The death penalty thus would be reserved only

8.
for the rare case of a rape so outrageous and so
serious in its consequences as to justify society's
ultimate penalty.

">/~~111
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I agree that the death penalty amounts to disproportionate punishment for the offense committed by the
petitioner.

~v,\IC..fiCiolo t.., ~
Rape is,s; , aye 4 s•:e,.~ serious crime, but

there is no indication here of excessive viciousness on
pe titioner's part or of serious, lasting harm to tre
victim.

In holding that capital punishment is

~lways

a disproportionate p e nalty for the crime of raping
an adult woman, however, the Court's opinion ranges
well beyond what is necessary to decide this case.
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating

circum-

~ stances that may be consider~ by the jury when

appropriate.

With respect to the crime of rape, only

three such circumstances are specified:

(i) tte

offense was committed by a person with a prior record
of conviction for a capital ~·*~ felony;

(ii) the

offense was committed while the offender was engaged in
another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horribleJror inhuman in that it involved torture,

depravi~

-2of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."
at 3.

Ante,

Only the third circumstance describes in general

the offense of aggravated rape, often identified as a
See,~'

separate and more heinous offense than rape.

Model Penal Code § 207.4, comment at 246 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.363; 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws,
c. 1201'

~ 2(a)(2)~ That

third circumstance was not

submitted to the jury in this case, as the evidence
such
would not have supported/a finding.

~1inappropriate

It is therefore

for the Court to write in terms

so sweeping as necessarily to foreclose e ach of the
fifty state legislatures from creating a narrowly defined
substantive crime of aggravated rape punishable by

"the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable ' mode of punishment for crime; nefrher
is it always disproportionate to the crime for
which it is imposed."

Ante, at 5.

d'
jnvlJ]yed

T

,.; ,.sa nf
lllUtder

ose

Jsffi&adJ-p

-3-

cQri~t rv..r\i~~
A ~~~~ ~@A~l~~

may be imposed on those sentenced

in accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and

-

~ at least when the offender is convicted of

Woodson,

murder, the crime involved in all five of last Term's
capital cases.
Today, in a case that does not require such an
t_)(rAA~;II ~
--·~~piR§-~pronouncement,

the Court draws a bright line

between murder and all rapes.

I dissent

I am by no means persuaded that such a
is appropriate.

As

.m~aem

because

bright line

noted in Snider v. Peyton, 356

F.~

1

" [1..] ~(e.
~is

626, 627 (CA4 1966),
degree of

~:H:~

culpability of

deliberate viciousness of the
than that of the murderer.

extreme variation in the

~kw

rapists."

The

rapist may be greater

Rape is never an act committed

accidentally.
~ ~eftXfti~~»

Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated.

There is equal variation in effect on the victim.

The

Court says that "[l]ife is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly
so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair ."
fungible.

Ante, at 13.

But rapes are not

Some victims are so grievously injured

physically~

or psychologically that life is beyond repair.

~~;~
A

I

may be that the death penalty.ts not disproportion-

-4ate punishment for the crime of aggravated rape.

Final ·

resolution of the question must await a thorough and
careful inquiry into objective indicators of society's
"evolving standards of decency,"

particularly legislative

enactments and the responses of juries in capital cases.
See Gregg v.

Georgi~,

428 U.S, at 173-182 (plurality

opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S., at 294-295
(plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.,at
436-443 (Powell, J., dissenting).

The Court properly

examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion
that society finds the death penalty unacceptable for
the usual rape case.

But it has not been shown that society

ro.p•'s~,

finds the penalty disproportionate for all.A.1:apescaees,

T""

P-

~more

ft'oro..,-- ~

ct.

discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes

~iML&welizms

II

well might discover that both juries and

legislatures have reserved tre ultimate penalty for the
rare case of an outrageous rape resulting in serious,
lasting harm to the victim.

I ·would not prejudge "the

issue.

respectfully dissent.

To this extent, I

1l-

I
I

Coker --footnotes

1. '

Tile North Carolina provision was part of the

mandatory death penalty statute struck down in Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. "2-~ (1976) .

2.

@Hex-aelb!Lww!sanwti. It is not this Court's function

criteria that might

to formulate the

relevant/distinguis~

aggravated rape

a workable
fromG the more usual case, but perhaps/~~ test
would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the
gMl~a~ilik~

cruelty or viciousness of the offender,

the circumstances and manner in which the offense was
committed, and the consequences suffered by the victim.

~. ~t.JI..' '/~ \). ~. C)l.{2- (let 7'L.);

See also Ralp

g.j

v. Warden,

at 794 (Haynsworth, J.).

difficulty

438 F.2d 786 (CA4 1970)
I do not minimize the

-- ~Ma-..a..
in~~ ts di!fSijijat:e=J:I i
constitutional
/requirements.tl

~ (1972)

(Powell, J., dissenting).

~~ ~ ka.s ~ bas.·s : . . . ~~ ~
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UNITED STATES

No. 75-5444
Ehrlich Anthony Coker,)
Petitioner,
On Writ of Certiorari to the Su.
v.
preme Court of Georgia.
State of Georgia.

[May-, 1977]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or...
dinarily tfte. death ~i:lt~' is disproportionateJ or the Crime
of raping an adult woman. Although rape is invariably a
serious crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense:
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim
sustai11ed serious or lasting injury. The Court does not,
however. limit its holding to the case before us or to similar
cases. Rather. in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is
l'lecessary, the Court holds that capital punishment alwaysregardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty
for the crime of rape.
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,·
428 U. S. 153 (1976). specifies aggravating circumstances
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate.
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such circumstances are specified: ( i) the offense was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
(ii) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged
i u another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and·
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3.' Only the"
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third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra·
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4,
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro·
posed Official Dra.ft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363; 1973
N. C. Sess. Laws, c. 1201, § 2 (a) (2). 1 That third circum·
stance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evidence would not have supported such a finding. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated
rape punishable by death. 2
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that:
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante, at 5.
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced
iu accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and
Woodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder,
the crime involved in all five of last Terrri's capital cases.
1 The North Carolina provision was part of the mandatory death
penalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
2
It is not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that
might distinguish aggrava,ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner in
whiCh the offpnse was committed, and the consequences suffered by the
viciim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert.
-dPnied, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.).
The legi:;lative task of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements
of the offense of aggravatt>d rape would not be easy, see Furman v.
Gl.'orqw, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), but cer..
taml;} tins Court should not ass\1me that the task is impossible.
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Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am
not persuaded that such a bright line is appropriate. As noted
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists."
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed accidentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court
says that "[1] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair:" Ante,
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is
beyond repair.
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportionfl,te punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final
resolution of the question must await careful inqtJiry into objective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency,"
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries
in capital cases. 3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.,
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S.,
at 436--443 (PowELL, J., dissenting). The Court properly
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion th11t
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the usual rape
case. But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might
3 These objectiv<' indicators are highly relevant., but the ultimate decision as to the appropriatenel>S of the ·death . penalty under the Eighth
\mendment-m; the Court notes, ·ante, at 12-must be "decided on the
I~H !-ilH of OlJr own judgment in light of· the precedents of thi!il Court.
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discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent.
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or...
dinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime
of raping an adult woman. Although rape is invariably a
serious crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense:
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim
sustaiued serious or lasting injury. The Court does not,
however. limit its holding to the case before us or to similar
cases. Rather. in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment alwaysregardless of the. circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty
for the crime of rape.
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,·
428 U. S. 153 ( 1976). specifies aggravating circumstances
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate.
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such circumstances are specified: (i) the offense was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
( 1i ) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged
iu another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and
(iii ) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an a~gravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the·
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third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra·
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4,
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro·
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363; 1973
N. C. Sess. Laws, c. 1201, § 2 (a) (2). 1 That third circumstance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evidence would not have supported such a finding. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated
rape punishable by death. 2
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that:
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante, at 5.
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced
iu accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and
Woodson, at least wheu the offender is convicted of murder,
t he crime involved in all five of last Terrri's capital cases.
The North Carolina provision was part of the mandatory death
nenalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) .
2
lt is not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that
might distinguish aggravated rape from the more usual case, but perhaps
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner ·in
which the offense was committed, and the consequences suffered by the
v1etim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert .
.Oemt>d, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.).
T he legislative taHk of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements
of the offenst' of aggravated rape would not be easy, see Furman v,
(if!or yia, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), but cer-.
tmnlJ this Court should not as:l\tme that the task is impossible.
1

'
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Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am
not persuaded that SU{)h a bright line is appropriate. As noted
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966) , "[t]here
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists."
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than
that of the murderer.' Rape is never an act committed accidentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court
says that "[11 ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante,
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life ·is
beyond repair.
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion;tte punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into objective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency,"
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries
in capital cases.a See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.,
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S.,
at 436-443 (PowELL, J., dissenting). The Court properly
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the usual rape
case. But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might
Thrse objectivl' indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate deciaR to thr appropriatrne:::s of the death penalty under the Eighth
.-\mendmrnt-ao; thl' Cou rt notes, ·ante, at 12-must be decided on the
l~:lRi~ ol' O\lr own judgment in light of· the precedenti;i of thii;i Court.
3

~JOn
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discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent.
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On Writ of Certiorari to the Suv.
preme Court of Georgia.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or...
dinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime
·
of raping an adult ·woman. Although rape §} invariabi~ a ~
.,...t-+__~··'-ts crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense:1
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim
sustaitu'u serious or lasting injury. The Court does not,
owever, limit its holding to the case before us or to similar
cases. Rather . in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment alwaysregardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty
for the crime o~pe.
The Georgia statute. sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,·
428 U. S. 153 (1976). specifies aggravating circumstances
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate.
'With respec t to the crime of rape, only three such circumstances are specified: ( i) the offense was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
( ti ) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged
iu another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and
(iii ) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or·
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the·
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third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra·
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4,
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro..
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.36~
(Itt?~
,....-~~~--.r;::::;;;;w;~~!@ii,-~'~. .~., That third circum ..
stance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evidence would not have supported such a finding. It is there ..
fore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated' .•J~
rape punishable by death!b
v
'--"In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that:
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dis..
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante, at 5.
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced
i11 accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and
Tr oodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder,
the crime involved in all five of last Term's capital cases.
~--...1

1e
orth Carolina provision was part of the mandatory eat
p<'nalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
IS not t us ourt's function to formulate the relevant criteria that
might, distinguish aggrava,ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner ·in
winch the offense was committed, and the consequences sufferl:'d by the
v1ctim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert.
demPd, 408 U. S. 942 (1972); id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.).
The legislativl:' task of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements
of the offl:'nsl:' of aggravatPd rape would not be easy, see Furman v.
Geuroia, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), but ceh
t~ml) tl11~ Court should not aSS\IIne that the task is impossible.

(t.v.} .
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Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am
not persuaded that sueh a bright line is appropriate. As notecrin Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here
ls extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists."
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed accidentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court
says that "[1] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante,
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is
beyond repair.
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion;:tte punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into objective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency,"
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries
in capital cases~ See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.,
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.,
at 436-443 (PowELL, J. , dissenting). The Court properly
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that
ociety finds the death penalty unacceptable for
~But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might

G
'-¥

GThe~e objectivr indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate deci~ Jon

as to tlw appropriatrne~s of the death . penalty under the Eighth
.\mcndmcnt-as thr Court notes, -ante, at 12-must be ·decided on the
hn Ri~ of 0\11' own .i ud~ment in light of· the precedents of thif:l Court.
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discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of this
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that ordinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime
pf raping an adult woman. Although rape invariably is a
reprehensible crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim sustained serious or lasting injury.. The Court does not,
however, limit its holding to the case before us or to similar
cases. Rather, in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment alwaysregardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty
for the crime of rape.
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,·
428 U. S. 153 ( 1976), specifies aggravating circumstances
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate.
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such circumstances are specified: (i) the offense was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
(ii) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged
~n another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the
third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra--

'

.
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vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinou~
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4,
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (ProIJ. -r .
1
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363 (1975 / ~
.Rev.). That third circumstance was not submitted to the
jury in this case, as the evidence would not have supported
such a finding. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Court
to write in t€rms so sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50
state legislatures from creating a narrowly defined substan~
tive crime of aggravated rape punishable by death. 1
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that:
"The death penalty is not ipvariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed."
Ante, at 5.
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced
in accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and
Woodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder,
the crime involved in all five of last Tenn.'s capital cases.
Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder
and all rapes-rega.rdless of the degree of brutality of the
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am I
1 It. i~ not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that
might distingui:;h aggrava.ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps
iL workable te:;t. would embrace the factor:; identified by Georgia: the
eruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner in
which the offense was committed, and the consequences suffered by the
vie tim . See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F . 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert,
dc·nied, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.).
The lPgi:;lative tilsk of defining, wit.h appropriate specificity, the elements
of the offense of aggravated rape wopld not be easy, see Furman v.
Georgia. 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), but cer~
i '' inly t hi.R Court should not ass1,1me that the task is impossible.
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not persuaded that such a bright line is appropriate. As noted
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists."
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed accidentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. There
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court
says that "[l] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante,
1tt 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is
.beyond repair.
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion(:l.te punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into objective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency,"
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries
in capital cases. 2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 173-182
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.,
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S.,
at 436-443 (PowELL, J., dissenting). The Court properly
.examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the crime of
rape in the absence of aggravating circumstances. But it
has not been shown that society finds the penalty disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might
discover that both juries and le~islatures have reserved the
;ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent.
~These objective indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate decision as to the appropriateness of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment-as the Court notes, ante, at 12-must be decidrd on the
,basis of our own judgm«:>nt in light of the precedents of this Court.
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From: The Chief Justioe

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissentin gfteoiroulated:

-------

In a case such as this, confusion often arises as
to what is the Court's proper role in reaching a decision .
Our task is not to give effect to our individual views
on capital punishment; rather, we have taken oaths to
determine what the Constitution pennits a State to do
under its reserved powers.

In striking down the death

penalty imposed upon the petitioner in this case, the Court
has overstepped the bounds of proper constitutional
adjudication by substituting its policy judgment for that
of the State legislature.

I accept that the Eight.h Amend-

ment's concept of disproportionality bars the death penalty
for minor

crimes~

But rape is not a minor crime; hence

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does net give the
Members of this Court license to engraft their conceptions
of proper public policy concerning the death penalty onto
the considered legislative judgments of the States.

Sinc e

I cannot agree that Georgia lacked the constitutional power
to impose the penalty of death for rape, I dissent from
the Court's judgment.
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(1)
On December 5, 1971, the petitioner, Ehrlich Anthony
Coker, raped and then stabbed to death a young woman.

Less

than eight months later Coker kidnapped and raped a second
young woman.

After twice raping this sixteen-year old

victim, he stripped her, severely beat her with a club, and
dragged her into a wooded area where he left her for dead.
He was apprehended and pleaded guilty to offenses stemming
from these incidents.

He was sentenced by three separate

courts to three life terms, two 20-year terms, and one
1/
eight-year term of imprisonment.- Each judgment specified
that the sentences it imposed were to run consecutively
rather than concurrently.

Approximately one and one-half

years later, on September 2, 1974, petitioner escaped from
the State prison where he was serving these sentences.

He

promptly raped another 16-year-old woman in the presence of
her husband, abducted heL from her horne, and threatened her

!/

On March 12, 1973, the Superior Court of Richmond
County, Georgia, sentenced Coker to twenty years'
imprisonment for the kidnapping of petitioner's
second victim, and to life imprisonment for one
act of rape upon her. On May 28, 1973, the Superior
Court of Taliaferro County, Georgia, sentenced
Coker to eight years' imprisonment for aggravated
assault upon the same victim, and to life imprisonment for the second rape upon her. On April 6,
1973, the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia,
sentenced Coker to twenty years' imprisonment for
the rape of petitioner's first victim, and to life
imprisonment for her murder. Appendix, at 306-312.
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with death and serious bodily harm.

It is this crime for

which the sentence now under review was imposed.
The Court today holds that the State of Georgia may
not impose the death penalty on Coker.

In so doing, it

prevents the State from imposing any effective punishment
upon Coker for his latest rape.

The Court's holding,

moreover, bars Georgia from guaranteeing its citizens that
they will suffer no further attacks by this habitual rapist.
In fact, given the lengthy sentences Coker must serve for
the rapes he is known to have committed, the Court's holding
assures that petitioner -- and others in his position -- will
henceforth feel no compunction whatsoever about committing
further rapes as frequently as they may be able to escape
from confinement and indeed even
the prison itself.

within the walls of

To what extent we have left states

''elbow room" to deal with depraved human beings like Coker
so as to protect others remains in doubt.

(2)
My first disagreement with the Court's holding is
its unnecessary breadth.

The narrow issue here presented

is whether the State of Georgia may constitutionally execute
this petitioner for the particular rape which he has
committed, in light of all the facts and circumstances shown
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by this record.

The plurality opinion goes to great lengths

to consider societal mores and attitudes toward the generic
crime of rape and punishment for it; however, the opinion
gives little attention on the special circumstances which bear
directly on whether imposition of the death penalty is an
appropriate societal response to Coker's criminal acts:
(a) On account of his prior offenses, Coker is already serving
such lengthy prison sentences that imposition of additional
periods of imprisonment would have no incremental punitive
effect;

(b) by his life pattern Coker has shown that he

presents a particular danger to the safety, welfare and
chastity of women generally, and on his record the likelihood
is therefore great that he will repeat his crime at first
opportunity;

(c) petitioner escaped from prison, only a year

and a half after he commenced serving his latest sentences;
he has nothing to lose by further escape attempts; and (d)
should he again succeed in escaping from prison, it is
reasonably predictable that he will repeat his pattern of
attacks on women

and with impunity since the threat of added

prison sentences is no deterrent.
Unlike the Court, I would at the very least narrow
the inquiry in this case to the question actually presented:
Does the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual
punishment prohibit the State of Georgia from executing a

-
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person who has, within the space of three years, raped three
separate women, killing one and attempting to kill -- and
leaving for dead -- another , who is serving prison terms
exceeding his probable lifetime and who has not hesitated
to escape confinement at the first available opportunity?
Whatever one's view may be as to the State's constitutional
power to impose the death penalty upon a rapist who stands
before a court convicted for the first time, this case
reveals a chronic rapist whose danger to the community is
abundantly clear.
Mr. Justice Powell would hold the death sentence inappropriate in this case because

11

there is no indication that

petitioner's offense was committed with excessive brutality
or that the victim sustained serious or lasting injury ...

2/
Ante, at 1.-

~/

Apart from the reality that rape is inherently

The position today adopted by Mr. Justice Powell
constitutes a disquieting shift from the view he
embraced several Terms ago in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 460-61 (1972), where he stated:
11

While I reject each of [petitioners'] attempts
to establish specific categories of cases in
which the death penalty may be deemed excessive,
I view them as groping toward what is for me the
appropriate application of the Eighth Amendment.
While in my view the disproportionality test may
not be used either to strike down the death
penalty for rape altogether or to 1nstall the
Court as a tribunal for sentencing review, that
test may find its appl1cat1on in the pecul1ar
circumstances of speciflc cases.
Its utilization
should be l1m1ted to the rare case 1n wh1ch the

-
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one of the most egregiously brutal acts one human being
can inflict upon another, there is nothing in the Eighth
Amendment that so narrowly limits the factors which may be
considered by a State Legislature in determining whether a
particular punishment is grossly excessive.

Surely

recidivism, especially the repeated commission of heinous
crimes, is a factor which may properly be weighed as an
aggravating circumstance, permitting the imposition of a
punishment more severe than for a single isolated offense. For
as a matter of national policy, Congress has expressed its
will that a person who has committed two felonies will suffer
enhanced punishment for a third one, 18

u.s.c.

§3575(e) (1);

Congress has also declared that a second conviction for
assault on a mail carrier may be punished more seriously
than a first such conviction, id. §2114.

Many States provide

an increased penalty for habitual criminality.

See, e.g.,

Wis. Stat. §939.62; see also Annot, 58 A.L.R. 20, 82 A.L.R.
3/
345, 79 A.L.R.2d . 826.- As a factual matter, the plurality

~/

Continued death penalty is rendered for a crime technically
falllng within the legislatlvely defined class
but factually falling outs1de the l1kely legislative intent in creating the category. Specific
rape cases (and speclflc hom1c1des as well) can
be imagined in which the conduct of the accused
would render the ultimate penalty as grossly
excessive punishment."
[Emphasis added.]

ll

This Court has consistently upheld the constitutional
validity of such punishment-enhancing statutes.

ex~le,
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opinion is correct in stating that Coker's "prior convictions
do not change the fact that the instant crime being punished
is rape not involving the taking of life," ante, at 14;
however, it cannot be disputed that the existence of these
prior convictions make Coker a substantially more serious
4/
menace to society than a first-time offender:"There is a widely held view that those
who present the strongest case for severe

~./

Continued See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 559-60
(1967F
"No claim is made here that recidivist
statutes are . . . unconstitutional, nor could
there be under our cases.
Such statutes and
other enhanced-sentence laws, and procedures
designed to implement their underlying policies,
have been enacted in all the States, and by
the Federal Government as well . . . . Such
statutes . . • have been sustained in this
Court on several occasions against contentions
that they violate constitutional strictures
dealing with double jeopardy, ex post facto
laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities."
(Footnote and citations omitted; emphasis added.)
Accord Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962).

!/

This special danger is demonstrated by the very
record in this case. After tying and gagging
the victim's husband, and raping the victim,
petitioner sought to make his getaway in their
automobile. Leaving the victim's husband tied
and gagged in his bathroom, Coker took the victim
with him. As he started to leave, he brandished
the kitchen knife he was carrying and warned
the husband that "if he would get pulled over
or the police was following him in any way that
he would kill -- he would kill my wife. He said
he didn't have nothing to lose -- that he was in
pr1son for the rest of his life, anyway . . . . "
Testimony of the victim's husband, Appendix, at
121 (emphasis added) •
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measures of incapacitation are not murderers
as a group (their offenses often are
situational) but rather those who have
repeatedly engag ed in v1ol e nt, combative
behavior. A well-demonstrated prope nsity
for life-endangering behavior is thought
to provide a more solid basis for infliction
of the most severe measures of incapacitation
than does the fortuity of a single homicidal
incident." Packer, Making the Punishment
Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1080
(1964).
[Emphasis added.]
~n

my view, the Eighth Amendment does not prevent

the State from taking an individual's "well demonstrated
propensity for life-endangering behavior" into account in
devising punitive measures which will prevent inflicting
further harm upon innocent victims.
428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976).
White succinctly noted:

See Gregg v. Georgia,

Only one year ago Mr. Justice

"death finally forecloses the

possibility that a prisoner will commit further crimes,
whereas life imprisonment does not."
428 U.S. 325, 354 (1976)

Robert v. Louisiana,

(White, J., dissenting); see also,

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.-S., at 238 (White~ · J., concurring).
In sum, once the Court has held that "the punishment
of death does not invariably violate the Constitution,"
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 169, it seriously impinges
upon the State's legislative judgment to hold that it may not
impose such sentence upon an individual who has shown total
and repeated disregard for the welfare, safety, personal
integrity and human worth of others, and who seemingly
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cannot be deterred from continuing such conduct.

~/

I

therefore would hold that the death sentence here imposed
is within the power reserved to the State and leave for
another day the question of whether such sanction would be
proper under other circumstances.

The dangers which

inhere whenever the Court casts its constitutional decisions
in terms sweeping beyond the facts of the case presented,
are magnified in the context of the Eighth Amendment.

In

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 238, !-1r. Justice Powell, in
dissent, stated:
11

~/

Where, as here, the language of the applicable
[constitutional] provision provides great
leeway and where the underlying social policies
are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great.
It is
too easy to propound our subjective standards
of wise pollcy under the rubrlc of more or less
universally held standards of decency."
(Emphasis added.)

Professor Packer addressed this:
11

What are we to do with those whom we cannot
reform, and in particular, those who by our
failure are thought to remain menaces to
life? Current penal theories admit, indeed
insist upon, the need for permanent incapacitation in such cases. Once this need is
recognized,the death penalty as a means
for incapacitation for the violent psychopath
can hardly be objected to on grounds that will
survive rational scrutiny, if the use of the
death penalty in any situation lS to be
permitted. And its use in rape cases as a
class, while inept, is no more so than its
use for any other specific offense involving
danger to life and limb." 77 Harv. L. Rev.,
at 1081.
(Emphasis added.)
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Since the Court now invalidates the death penalty as a
sanction for all rapes of adults at all times under all
circumstances,

§/

I reluctantly turn to what I see as the

broader issues raised by this holding.

( 3)

The plurality, pp. 12-13 ante, acknowledges the
gross nature of the crime of rape.

A rapist not only

violates a victim's privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical
harm in the process.

The long-range effect upon the victim's

life and health is likely to be irreparable; it is impossible
to measure the harm which results.

Volumes have been

written by victims, physicians and psychiatric specialists
on the lasting injury suffered by rape victims.

Rape is

not a mere physical attack -- it is destructive of the human
personality.
documented

§./

For some victims, and many of these are

medic~lly,

it distorts the balance of the victim's

I find a disturbing confusion as to th i s issue in
the plurality opinion. The issue is whether
Georgia can, under any circumstances and for any
kind of rape -- "mild" or "gross" -- impose the
death penalty. Yet the plurality opinion opens
its discussion, apparently directed at demonstrating that this was not an "aggravated" rape, saying
that following the rape and kidnapping, "Mrs.
Carver was unharmed."
(Ante,p.2.) If the Court
is holding that no rape can ever be punished by
death, why is it relevant whether Mrs. Carver was
"unharmed"?

-

life.
attack

11 -

If the victim has children

before or after the

the victim's trauma can readily affect them --

and indeed the husband and the home life of all involved.
I therefore wholly agree with Mr. Justice White's conclusion
as far as it goes-- that "[s]hort of homicide,
the 'ultimate violation of the self.' "

[rape] is

Ante, at 12.

Victims may recover from the physical damage of knife or
bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or a club, but
recovery from the assault on a human personality is not
healed by medicine or surgery.

To speak blandly of rape

victims "unharmed," or classify the human outrage of rape
in terms of "brutal" versus "non-brutal" takes no account
of the profound suffering the crime imposes on the victims
or their loved ones.
Despite its strong condemnations of rape, the Court
reaches the inexplicable conclusion that "the death penalty .
is an excessive penalty" for the perpetrator of this heinous

7/
offense.- This, _ the Court holds, is true even though in

Georgia the death penalty may be imposed only where the rape
is coupled with one or more aggravating circumstances and
the absence of mitigating circumstances.

The process by

which this conclusion is reached is as startling as it is

II

While only three Justices have joined Mr.
Justice White in this portion of his opinion,
see separate opinion of Mr. Justice Powell,
ante, I take this to be the view of the Court
1n light of Mr. Justice Brennan's and Mr.
Justice Marshall's statements joining the
judgment.

- 12 -

disquieting.

It represents a clear departure from precedent

by making this Court "under the aegis of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the
standards of criminal responsibility in diverse areas of the
criminal law, throughout the country."

Powell v. Texas, 392

8/
U.S. 514, 533 (1968)

(Opinion of Marshall, J.) .-

This

seriously strains and distorts our federal system, removing
much of· the flexibility from which it has drawn strength
for two centuries.
The analysis of the plurality opinion is divided
into two parts:

(a)

an "objective" determination that most

American Jurisdictions do not presently make rape a capital
offense, and (b) a subjective judgment that death is an
excessive punishment for rape because the crime does not,
in and of itself, cause the death of the victim.

I take

issue with each of these points.

~/

Only last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for Mr.
Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Stevens and himself
warned that "the requirement of the Eighth
Amendment must be applied with an awareness of
the limited role to be played by the courts," and
noted that "we may not act as judges as we might
as legislators" Id. at 174-75. Accord, Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428-u.s. at 355-56 (White, J.,
dissenting).
Mr. Justice Stewart further noted
that "[t]he deference we owe to decisions of
the state legislatures under our federal system,
[Furman v. Georgia, 407 U.S.], at 465-470 (Rehnquist, J.,
d1ssenting) is enhanced where the specification
of punishments is concerned, for 'these are
peculiarly questions of l e gislative pol1cy.'
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ."
~u.s. at 176. (Emphasis added.)
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(a)

The plurality opinion bases its analysis, in part,
on the fact that "Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in
the United States at the present time that authorizes the
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman."
Ante at 11;

Surely, however, this statistic cannot be deemed

determinative, or even particularly relevant.

Would the

position of the plurality be reversed if a majority of the
states followed Georgia?

As the opinion concedes, ante

p. 9, two other States -- Louisiana and North Carolina -have enacted death penalty statutes for adult rape since this
Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238.
If the Court is to rely on some "public opinion" process,
does this not suggest the beginning of a "trend"'.?

My view

is that we should be wary of statistics and "trends" in this
area.
More to the point, however, it is

~~opic

-- and novel

to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow
experience of the past five years.

Considerable uncertainty

was introduced into this area of the law by this Court's
Furman decision.

A large number of States found their death

penalty statutes invalidated; legislatures were left in serious
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doubt by the expressions vacillating between discretionary
and mandatory death penalties, as to whether this Court would

9/
sustain any statute imposing death as a criminal sanction.Failure of more states to enact statutes imposing death for
rape of an adult woman may thus reflect the result of hasty
legislative compromise occasioned by time pressures

following

Furman 1 or a desire to wait on the experience of those States
which did enact such statutes.
In any case, when considered in light of the experience
since the turn of this century, during which more than one
third of American jurisdictions have consistently provided
the death penalty for rape, the plurality's myopic focus on
the experience of the immediate past must be viewed as truly
disingenuous.

Having in mind the swift changes in positions

of some members of this Court in the short span of five years,
can it rationally be considered a relevant indicator of what
our society deems "crueLand unusual" to look solely to what
legislatures have refrained from doing under conditions of
~/

I take no satisfaction in my predictive caveat in

Furman:
"Since there is no majority of the Court on the
ultimate issue presented in these cases, the future
of capital punishment in this country has been
left in an uncertain limbo. Rather than
providing a final and unambiguous answer on
the basic constitutional question, the collective impact of the majority's ruling is to
demand an undetermined measure of change from
the various state legislatures and the Congress."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

- 15 -

-

.

great

~ncertainty

-

arising from our less than lucid opinions

on the Eighth Amendment?

Far more representative of

societal mores of the 20th Century is the accepted practice
in a substantial number of jurisdictions preceding the
Furman decision.

"The problem . .

• is the suddenness

of the Court's perception of progress in the human attitude
since decisions of only a short while ago."
Georgia, 408

u.s.

Furman v.

at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Cf.

Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
However, even were one to give the most charitable
acceptance to the plurality's statistical analysis, it still
does not, to my mind, support its conclusion.

The most that

can be claimed is that for the past year Georgia has been the
only State whose adult rape death penalty statute has not
otherwise been invalidated; two other State legislatures had
enacted rape death penalty statutes in the last five years,
but these were invalidated for reasons unrelated to rape
under the Court's decisions last Term.

Woodson v. North

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).

Even if these figures could be read as indicating

that no other States view the death penalty as an appropriate
punishment for the rape of an adult woman, it would not
necessarily follow that Georgia's imposition of such sanction
violates the Eighth Amendment.

- 16 -

The Court has repeatedly pointed to the reserve strength
of our federal system which allows State legislatures, within
broad limits, to experiment with laws, both criminal and
civil, in the effort to achieve socially desirable results.
See,

~Whalen

v. Roe, 45 U.S.L.W. 4166, 4168

&

n.22 (Feb. 22,

1977); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972)

(opinion

of Powell, J.); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 184-85
(1970) ' (Harlan, J., concurring); Fay v. New York, 332
261, 296 (1947).

u.s.

Various provisions of the Constitution,

including the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, of
course place substantive limitations on the type of experimentation a State may undertake.

However, as the plurality

admits, the crime of rape is second perhaps only to murder in
its gravity.

It follows then that Georgia did not approach

such substantive constraints by enacting the statute here in
question.

See also Section (3) (b), infra.

Statutory provisions in criminal justice used in one
part of the country can be carefully watched by other state
legislatures, so that the experience of one State becomes
available to all.

Although human lives are in the balance,

it must be remembered that failure to allow flexibility may
also jeopardize human lives -- those of the victims of undeterred
criminal conduct.

See pp. 22-23, infra.

Our concern for the

accused ought not foreclose legislative judgments showing

- 17 -

a modicum of consideration for the potential victims.
Three State legislatures have, in the past five years,
determined that human death and the devastating consequences
of rape will be minimized if certain rapists are executed for
10/
their offenses.-- That these States are presently a minority
does not, in my view, make their judgment less worthy of
deference.

Our concern for human life must not be confined

to the guilty; a State legislature is not to be thought
insensitive to human values because it acts firmly to protect
the lives and related values of the innocent.

In this area,

the choices for legislatures are at best painful and difficult
and deserve a high degree of deference.

Only last Term

Mr. Justice White observed:
"It will not do to denigrate the se legislative judgments as some form of vestigal
savagery or as purely retributive in motivation;
for they are solemn judgments, reasonably based,
that imposition of the death penalty will save
the lives of innocent persons. This concern
for life and human values and sincere efforts
of the States to pursue them are matters of the
greatest moment with which the judiciary should
be most reluctant to interf e r e ." Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 u.s. at 325 (White, J., dissenting).
(Emphasis· added.)
The question of whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for rape is surely an open one.

It is

10/
The statute here in question does not provide
--the death penalty for any and all rapists. Rather,
the jury must find that at least one statutorily
defined aggravated circumstance is present. Ga.
Code Ann. §§ 26-3102, 27-2534.l(b) (1), (2) & (7).
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arguable that many prospective rapists would be deterred
by the possibility that they could suffer death for their
offense; it is also arguable that the death penalty would have
11/
only minimal deterrent effect.-- It may well be that rape
victims would become more willing to report the crime and
aid in the apprehension of the criminals if they knew that
community disapproval of rapists was sufficiently strong to
inflict the extreme penalty; or perhaps they would be reluctant
to cooperate in the prosecution of rapists if they knew that
a conviction might result in the imposition of the death
penalty.

Quite possibly, the occasional, well-publicized

execution of egregious rapists may cause citizens to feel
12/
greater security in their daily lives;-- or, on the contrary,
11/
"The value of capital punishment as a
-- deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue
the resolution of which properly rests with
the legislatures, which can evaluate the results
of statistical studies in terms of their own
local conditions and with a flexibility of approach
that is not available to the courts. Furman v.
Georgia _[408 U.S.], at 403-405 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting.)" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. at 186
(plurality opinion).
12/
"There are many cases in which the sordid,
--heinous nature of a particular [rape], demeaning,
humiliating, and often physically or psychologically
traumatic, will call for public condemnation."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 459 (Powell, J., dissenting).

- 19 -

it may be that members of a civilized community will suffer
the pangs of a heavy conscience because such punishment will

1:1..1

be perceived as excessive.

We cannot know which among this

range of possibilities is correct, but today's holding forecloses the very exploration we have said federalism was
intended to foster.

It is difficult to believe that Georgia

would long remain alone in punishing rape by death if the
next decade demonstrated a drastic reduction in the incidence
of rape, an increased cooperation by rape victims in the apprehension and prosecution of rapists, and a greater confidence in
the rule of law on the part of the populance.
In order for any legislative program to develop it
must be given time to take effect so that data may be evaluated
for comparison with the experience of States which have not
enacted death penalty statutes.

Today, the Court repudiates

Georgia's solemn judgment on how best to deal with the crime
of rape before anyone cap know whether

th~ _ death

penalty is

an effective deterrent for one of the most horrible of all
crimes.

And this is done a few short years after Justice

Powell's excellent statement:
13/
Obviously I have no special competence to
--make these judgme nts, but by the same token no
other member of the Court is competent to make a
contrary judgment. This is why our system has,
until now, left these difficult policy choices
to the state legislatures, who may be no wiser, but
surely are more attuned to the mores of their communities than are we.
)
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"In a period in our country's history when
the frequency of [rape] is increasing alarmingly,
it is indeed a grave event for the Court to take
from the States whatever deterrent and retributive
weight the death penalty retains." Furman v.
Georgia, 408 u.s. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
To deprive states of this authority as the Court does, on the
basis that "the current judgment with respect to the death
penalty for rape . . • weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping
an adult woman,"

ante at 11, is impermissibly rash.

The

current

judgment of some members of this Court has undergone
14/
significant change in the short time since Furman.-- Social
change on great issues generally reveals itself in small increments, and the "current judgment" of many States could well
be altered on the basis of Georgia's experience, were we
15/
to allow its statute to stand.-Indeed as recently as 1971 -- a year before
Furman -- a majority of this Court appeared to
have no doubt about the constitutionality of the
death penalty. See McGautha v. California, 402

u. s.

15/

183 (1971).

To paraphrase Mr. Justice Powell , "[w]hat
[the Court is] saying, in effect, i 3 that
the evolutionary process has come s 1denly
to an end; that the ultimate wisdom a s to
the appropriatene ss of capital punishment
[for adult rape] under all circumstnaces, and
for all future generations, has somehow been
revealed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 431
(Powell, J., d i ssenting).
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(b)

The subjective judgment that the death penalty is
simply disproportionate for the crime of rape is even more
disturbing than the "objective" analysis discussed supra.
The plurality's conclusion on this point is based upon the bare
fact that murder necessarily results in the physical death
o f the victim, while rape does not.

Ante at 13, 15.

However,

n o Member of the Court explains why this distinction has relevance,
much less constitutional

significance.

It is, after all,

not irrational -- nor constitutionally impermissible -for a legislature to make the penalty more severe than the act
16 /
it punishes-- --as for example with the death penalty for
17/
felony homicides-- -- in the hope it would deter future
wrongdoing:
"We may not require the legislature to select the
least severe penalty possible so long as the pena lty
selected is not crue lly inhuman or disproportiona te
to the crime involved." Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 153. Accord, Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S.,
at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
16 / For example, hardly any thief would be deterred
from stealing if the only punishment upon being
caught were return of the money stolen.
1 7/ Only recently we declined to review the death penalty
imposed under a felony murder statute on a
participant who was not the "trigger man. 11 Smith v.
Texas, No. 76-5854, cert.denied, March 8, 1976;
Livingston v. Texas, No. 76-6326, cert. denied,
May 23, 1976.
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It begs the question to state, as does the plurality
opinion:
"Life is over for the victim of the murderers; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy
as it was, but is not over and normally is not beyond
repair." Ante at 13.
Until now, the issue under the Eighth Amendment has not been
the state of any particular victim after the crime, but rather
whether the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate
to the evil committed by the perpetrator.

See, Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
458 (Powell, J., dissenting).

As a matter of constitutional

principle, that test cannot have the primitive simplicity :·
of "life . for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth."

Rather

States must be permitted to engage in a more sophisticated
weighing of values in dealing with criminal activity which
consistently poses grave danger of death or grave bodily
harm.

If innocent life and limb is to be preserved I see no

constitutional barrier in punishing by death all who engage
in such activity, regardless of whether the risk comes to
fruition in any particular instance.

See Packer, supra,

77 Harv. L. Rev . at 1077-79.
Only one year ago the Court held it constitutionally
permissible to impose the death penalty for the crime of
murder, provided that certain procedural safeguards are
followed.

Compare Gregg v. Georgia, supra, Proffitt v.

Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976) with Roberts v. Louisiana, supra and Woodson v.
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North Carolina, supra.

Today, the Court readily admits that

"[s]hort of homicide,

[rape] is the 'ultimate violation of

self.'"

Moreover, as stated by Mr. Justice

Ante at 12.

Powell,
"[t]he threat of serious injury is implicit in
the definition of rape; the victim is either forced
into submission by physical violence or by the threat
of violence." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 460.
Rape thus is not a crime "light-years" removed from murder
in the degree of its heinousness; it certainly poses a serious
potential danger to the life and safety of innocent victims
apart from the devasting psychic consequences.

It would

seem to follow therefore that, affording the States proper
18/
leeway under the broad standard of the Eighth Amendment,-18/ Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for himself, Mr.
-- ·Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens in
Gregg v. Georgia noted that "in assessing a
punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature against the constitutional measure
[of the Eighth Amendment], we presume its
validity . .
A heavy burden rests on those
who would attack ·the judgment of the representatives
of the people." 428 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added.)
Accord, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell,
J., dissenting) .
The reasons for this special deference to State
legislative enactments was described:
"This is true in part because the constitutional
test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary
standarqs and the legislative judgment weighs heavily
in ascertaining such standards.
"[I]n a democratic
society legislatures, not courts, are constituted
to respond to the will and consequently the moral
values of the people.' Furman v. Georgia, [408 U.S.],
at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)." Id. at 175-176.

-
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murder is properly punishable by death, rape should be also,
if that is the considered judgment of the legislators.
The Court's conclusion to the contrary is very
disturbing indeed.

The clear implication of today's holding

appears to be that the death penalty may be properly imposed
only as to crimes resulting in death of the victim.
casts

~erious

This

doubt upon the constitutional validity of

statutes imposing the death penalty for a variety of conduct
which, though dangerous, may not necessarily result in any
immediate death,
kidnapping.

~,

treason, airplane hijacking, and

In that respect, today's holding does even mo r e

harm that is initially apparent.

We cannot avoid judicial

notice that crimes such as airplane hijacking, kidnapping,
and mass terrorist activity constitute a serious and incre a sing
danger to the safety of the public.
indeed

It would be unfortunate

but quite likely -- that the effect of today's

holding would be to inhibit States and

th~~ederal

Gove rnment

from experimenting with various remedies -- including
possibly imposition of the penalty of death -- to prevent and
deter such crimes.
Some sound observations, made only a few years ago,
deserve repetition:
"Our task here, as must so frequently be
emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass
upon the constitutionality of legislation
that has been enacted and that is challenged.

- 25 This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow
our personal preferences as to the wisdom of
legislative and congressional action, on our
distaste for such action, to guide our judicial
decision in cases such as these.
The temptations
to cross that policy line are very great.
In fact,
as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) .
Whatever our individual views as to the wisdom of
capital punishment, I cannot agree that it is constitutionally
impermissible for a State legislature to make the "solemn
judgments" to impose the death penalty for the crime of rape.
Accordingly, I would leave to the States the task of legislating in this area of the law.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In view of additions to the Chief Justice's dissent
(e.g., p. 4 and 5 n. 2), I am adding to footnote 1 in my
little opinion two additional paragraphs as enclosed.
I understand from the printer that this will occasion
no problem.

'L.f(/.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss

Coker

6/28/77

The dissent of the Chief Justice, relying on
selected excerpts from my opinion in Furman, seeks to
buttress the view that for sentencing purposes a
meaningful distinction cannot be drawn

between rapes

regardless of the circumstances and effect upon the
victim.

Post, at 4, n.

difficulties of proof.

2.

The dissent emphasizes the

But the jury system is designed

and operates successfully to resolve precisely this type
of factual issue.

.

The law of negligence, for example , is

replete with issues requiring the jury to determine
degrees of culpability and the extent or permanency of
physical and psychological injury.
I am complimented by the frequency with which the
Chief Justice, in his dissent, cites and quotes from my
opinion in Furman.

That opinion, however, did not

prevail, and - as with most of the writing in Furman - it
now must be read in light of Gregg and Woodson, which have
established the controlling general principles.

But

contrary to implications in the Chief Justice's dissent,
my opinion in Furman

did emphasize that the

proportionality test as to rape should be applied on a
case-by-case basis, noting that in some cases the death
sentence would be "g rossly excessive ."
461.

Furman , supra, at

I remain 1n disagreement with the simplistic

all-or-nothing views of the plurality opinion and the
dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.
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